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vAbstract
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) has been the central proposition of finance
since its identification in the middle seventies. According to the EMH, a market can
be defined efficient when security prices always fully reflect all the available infor-
mation. Although the EMH has governed the academic world for a long time, such
a strong statement has been challenged at both theoretical and empirical ground
during the last thirty years. A series of so-called market anomalies have been ob-
served in real-world financial markets, and such strong evidence has brought about
the birth of a new field of study. Behavioral Finance is a new approach to financial
market that, being inspired by works and findings of psychologist and sociologist,
can be viewed as an interdisciplinary approach that merges foundations of econ-
omy, finance, psychology, sociology and other social sciences, to better understand
financial markets mechanisms and psychological processes of individuals under un-
certainty. The aim of this work it to provide a detailed representative agent model,
in order to study and analyze how and to what extent, under clear assumptions,
the risk-aversion of the agent can determine deviations of prices from its funda-
mental value and produce the emergence of any known market anomalies, such as
momentum and returns autocorrelations, as reported in the literature.
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Introduction
conomics and financial theories have for long been dominated by the Efficient Mar-
kets Hypothesis (EMH), which posits that market prices fully reflect all available
information. Efficient markets do not allow investors to earn above-average returns
without accepting above-average risks. Financial theories and models rests on a
formal representation of an individual who acts as a utility maximize, given his
preferences, and adheres to the axioms of a rational choice theory. Over the past
decades, however, psychologists and behavioral scientists have documented robust
and systematic violations of principles of expected utility theory, Bayesian learning,
and rational expectations. The idea of individual investors who are prone to bi-
ases in judgment, and use various heuristics, which might lead to anomalies on the
market level, has been explored within the field of behavioral finance. A number of
behavioral models have been developed for the purpose of studying agents behavior,
price discovery mechanisms, and the reproduction of the market anomalies.
This dissertation analyzes market implications of behavioral finance by means of
a representative agent model of financial market. The goal is to provide a model as
tool for studying the emergence of behavioral market anomalies. We aim to show
that such model can contribute to behavioral finance research by demonstrating if
and to what extent risk-aversion can be used as a substitute of individual biases in
determining market anomalies.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the
efficient markets hypothesis focusing particularly on its theoretical and empirical
foundations and the first main challenges moved against it. Chapter 2 presents
a survey of behavioral finance literature with special emphasis on the limits to
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arbitrage and on psychological biases of individual investor, through a description
of the prospect theory and a brief analysis of the most relevant (for our purpose)
behavioral models. Chapter 3 presents our representative agent model, and studies
its implications through its simulation. The last part of the thesis contains the
conclusions.
Chapter 1
From Financial Market Efficiency
to Behavioral Finance
1.1 The Traditional Finance Paradigm
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), also known as traditional finance paradigm,
has been the central proposition of finance since its identification in the middle
seventies. The EMH was discovered at the University of Chicago, and the pioneer of
such a theory was Eugene F. Fama in his famous papers Efficient Capital Market: a
review of theory and empirical work, published on the Journal of Finance in 1970 1.
That was an extraordinary success and the University of Chicago became the worlds
center of academic finance. Jensen (1978) declared that: there is no other proposition
in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it than Efficient
Market Hypothesis . These works was followed by a large number of economists such
as Harry Markowitz and James Tobin and a vast array of empirical findings quickly
emerged.
According to the EMH, a market can be defined efficient when security prices
always fully reflect all the available information. Given a market in which:
1. there are no transactions costs in trading security,
1B. G. Malkiel and E. F Fama (1970). “Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and
empirical work”. In: The journal of Finance 25.2, pp. 383–417
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2. all available information is costlessly available to all market participants, and
3. all agree on the implications of current information on price and distribution
of future stock prices,
obviously current prices fully reflect the available information (Malkiel and Fama
1970). With fully reflect is intended that when news about the fundamental value
of the security reach the market, its price reacts to these news incorporating them
quickly and correctly. Quickly means that it should not be possible to profit from
information after they have reached the market; correctly means that the price
adjustment in response to the information should be accurate on average 2. All
these conditions are sufficient condition for the capital market efficiency, but not
necessary; in fact even in markets in which one of the above conditions is not met,
it does not directly imply that market are inefficient 3 (prices will fully reflect the
available information as well). According to this definition of market efficiency, the
EMH states that the real-world financial markets are actually efficient.
In what follows, is provided an overview of the theoretical foundations and the
empirical foundations of the EMH and then the main challenges moved against
them, which have led to a new approach in studying financial markets.
1.1.1 EMH: theoretical foundations
The traditional finance paradigm rests on a strong argument, that is, in the models
used to understand financial markets, agents are assumed to be rational. Rationality
means that: a) when agents receive new information, they update their beliefs
correctly, following the Bayes law 4, and b) given their beliefs, agents make choices
2The stock prices should neither underreact nor overreact to particular information about the
fundamentals.
3For example, even if there are large transaction costs that may limit the transactions, as long
as market participants have access to all available information, market still remain efficient when
such transactions do take place.
4In probability theory, Bayes’ law relates the odds of event A1 to event A2, before and after
conditioning on another event B. The odds on A1 to event A2 is simply the ratio of the probabilities
of the two events. The prior odds is the ratio of the unconditional or prior probabilities, the
posterior odds is the ratio of conditional or posterior probabilities given the event B.
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that are consistent with the Expected Utility Theory 5. In other words it is possible
to argue that the EMH is the implementation of the rational expectations hypothesis
to financial markets. Firstly developed by Muth (1961), the rational expectations
hypothesis states that agent’s predictions of the future outcome of relevant events
equal the optimal forecast, formed using all available information. As a result,
rational expectations are not systematically wrong and any deviations from the
best forecast are only random. In an economic model, this is typically modeled
by assuming that the expected value of a variable is equal to the expected value
predicted by the model 6.
In term of financial markets, when agents are rational each security price equals
its fundamental value, that is the net present value of its future cash flow, discounted
using proper risk attitudes. When investors hear good news about fundamental
values of securities, they quickly respond to the new information by bidding up
prices, when instead the news is bad, they respond by bidding down prices. For
example, if a selling investor hears a positive earnings announcement, which implies
a growth in expected dividends, he will be willing to sell the corresponding security at
a higher price, and, of course, a buying investor will be willing to buy this security
at a higher price. As a consequence, security prices incorporate all the available
information immediately and prices adjust to new net present values of cash flows.
From another point of view, if a market is populated by rational risk-neutral agents,
return are unpredictable, or similarly security prices follow random walk model 7.
Allowing for risk-averse preferences, using varying level of risk and tolerance toward
risk, prices may no longer follow random walks, but investor rationality implies
anyway the impossibility of earning superior risk-adjusted returns 8; in other words
5See the next paragraph for further explanations
6Suppose that P is the equilibrium price in a simple market, determined by supply and demand.
The theory of rational expectations says that the actual price will only deviate from the expectation
if there is an ’information shock’ caused by information unpredictable at the time expectations were
formed.
7To be more precise, as Malkiel and Fama (1970) points out, prices will only follow random
walk if its future changes are independent and identically distributed. Consider just one period, if
the returns are independent and identically distributed, prices will not follow random walk given
that prices changes distribution now will depend on the level of prices. Furthermore, prices can
also follow random walk with drift if expected price changes are non-zero.
8To put it differently, when investors are rational it is impossible to beat the market.
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market is still efficient.
However, the basic theoretical case for the EMH relies on further assumptions,
which extend its strength. First, to the extent that some investors are not rational,
they cannot earn excess risk-adjusted average returns because their trades are ran-
dom, cancelling each other out without affecting prices. Second, to the extent that
investors are irrational in similar ways, even if their trades may have an influence
on price, rational traders (also called arbitrageurs) would eliminate immediately the
potential mispricing. In many scenarios, where some agents are not fully rational,
markets are still efficient, because they trade securities randomly. Indeed, even when
there is a large number of irrational investors, their trades are likely to cancel each
other out because of their strategies are uncorrelated. But, of course, this assump-
tion relies on the uncorrelation of traders strategy. To address this issue, Friedman
(1953) and Fama (1965) based this second assumption on the concept of arbitrage.
As Sharpe and Alexander (1990) point out, arbitrage is: the simultaneous purchase
and sale of the same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets at ad-
vantageously different prices . Suppose that in a market, a group of irrational traders
becomes excessively optimistic about future prospect of a security and through its
buying they cause an overpricing. Since now the security price exceeds its fundamen-
tal value (the properly discounted net present value of its cash flows) it represents
a bad buy. Arbitrageurs, smart investor, or rational traders, noting an attractive
opportunity, would sell or even sell short this expensive security and at the same
time would purchase a substitute security, which has similar features, to hedge their
risk. If such substitute security is available and the arbitrage is quick and effective
enough, arbitrageurs can earn a profit and the selling pressure on the overpriced
security will bring its price down to its fundamental value. A similar but inverse
procedure applies for the case of an underpricing.
The arbitrage argument has been very controversial, since it has a further impli-
cation. As noted by Friedman (1953), when a mispricing occurs, irrational investors
earn lower returns than arbitrageurs; therefore they lose money. In this sense, even
if arbitrage does not eliminate the irrational investors influence on prices, in the
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long run market forces cancel their wealth, so market efficiency prevails again.
1.1.2 Expected Utility Theory
The Expected Utility Theory (hereafter EUT) states that when an agent faces a
decisional problem, makes his choices between risky or uncertain events by compar-
ing their expected utility values: that is, the sums of the utility values of different
outcomes weighted by their respective probabilities. Given the distinction between
risk and uncertainty 9, there are two version of EUT, Subjective Expected Utility
Theory (SEUT) in the case of uncertainty, and von Neumann- Morgenstern Theory
(VNMT) in the case of risk. However, for the purpose of this work, we shall focus
principally on the VNMT for its close correlation with the rationality context.
VNMT takes its name from its discoverers John von Neumann and Oskar Mor-
genstern that, in 1947, proposed a parsimonious treatise on games theory and the
economic behavior 10. The VNM rationality is based on four axioms: transitivity,
completeness, continuity and independence.
Axiom 1 (Transitivity) Transitivity assumes that preference is consistent across
any three options: if an individual prefers the option A to option B and he
prefers the option B to option C, then must be that A is preferred to C.
If A  B and B  C, then A  C .
Axiom 2 (Completeness) Completeness assumes that an individual has well de-
fined preferences: an individual is always able to compare different uncertain
option, defining an order in term of preferences.
Axiom 3 (Continuity) Continuity assumes that there are not ”tipping points”
in preferences: if an individual prefers the option A to option B and prefers
9A decision problem with uncertainty concerns the case in which probabilities are not explicitly
part of the decision maker, or probabilities are not known.
10L. J. Neumann and O. Morgenstern (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior. Vol. 60.
Princeton university press Princeton, NJ.
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B to option C, then there exists a coefficient α ∈ [0, 1] such that a linear
combination of A and C is indifferent to B.
If A  B, B  C and α ∈ [0, 1], then [αA+ (1− α)C] ≈ B .
Axiom 4 (Independence) Independence of irrelevant alternatives assumes that
a preference holds independently of the possibility of another outcome: if an
individual prefers the option A to option B, then linear combination of A and
any C is preferred to any linear combination of B and C, given a coefficient
α ∈ (0, 1].
If A  B and α ∈ (0, 1]then for any C [αA+(1−α)C]  [αB+(1−α)C] .
According to VNMT when an individual faces an investment decision under risk,
whose outcomes are uncertain but their occurrence probabilities are known, if his
preferences satisfy four axioms has a utility function that assigns a monetary value
to each possible outcome. Given that individuals prefer to get more money than
less money from their choice, among the different risky alternatives individuals will
choose the one which is associated with the greatest expected utility value (maximize
expected utility). Such utility function has two important properties:
• it respects the individuals order of preferences;
• it is an increasing monotonic function: that is, it has positive marginal utility
of wealth, since a greater utility is obviously associated with greater outcomes.
Consider the utility function u(x), where x stands for the individuals wealth at
time t+ 1; assuming u(x) > 0, the expected utility of wealth is
E[u(x)] =
S∑
t=1
ptu(xt) (1.1.1)
1.1 The Traditional Finance Paradigm 9
With
∑S
t=1 pt = 1 and S is the number of the state of the world.
Among alternative risky actions, individuals will choose based on each respective
expected utility value. Then, a rational individual will choose the alternative which
has the greatest utility, based not on the expected value of outcomes, but on the
expected value of the corresponding utility. In other words, rationality implies that
individuals act as expected utility maximizers.
Suppose an agent facing an investment decision problem between two alterna-
tives: a riskless project with a certain fixed return, and a risky project which has the
same expected return. In making his choice, a rational agent will compare u(E[x])
(the utility of the expected outcome) with E[u(x)] (the expected utility of the out-
come). If the agent prefers to get the certain amount, being the return equal, than
the risky one, means that: u[E(x)] > E[u(x)]; in this case the decision makers is
called risk-averse.
The utility function can assume three different forms:
• it is concave when it describes the preferences of a risk-averse individual;
• it is convex when it describes the preferences of a risk-prone individual;
• it is linear when it describes the preferences of a risk-neutral individual (he is
indifferent in choosing between risky and certain project).
A way of measuring the intensity of risk aversion could be to compute the second
derivative of u(x), but the most used measures are the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion
indicators. The Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion is:
RA(x) = −u(x)
u(x)
,
where x represents the generic result. It is called local measure of risk because it
depends on the generic result x and its measurement is the inverse of the measure-
ment of x. Such coefficient determines the absolute amount that an agent is willing
to pay, to avoid the choice that presents a given riskiness. It is commonly assumed
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that RA decreases with decreasing wealth. Conversely, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient
of relative risk aversion, is given by:
RR(x) = −xu(x)
u(x)
= xRA(x).
Such coefficient determines the portion of wealth that an agent is willing to pay to
avoid the choice that presents a given riskiness. A number of studies sustain that
in the long-run the relative risk aversion is independent from the wealth; therefore
individuals with the same wealth tend to make the same decisions.
In economic research, due to their mathematical tractability, are often used util-
ity functions that belong to the so called Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion class
(HARA). A utility function is in the HARA class if the risk tolerance, that is the
inverse of RA, is linear with the wealth x
u(x) = ζ(η +
x
γ
)1−γ
With RA(x) = (η+
x
γ
)−1, hyperbolic function. Such function is defined for η+ x
γ
> 0.
Varying for different value of the parameters η and γ could be derived all utility
functions belonging to HARA class, in particular in the economic literature the most
treated are:
• Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA): if η = 0 the relative risk aversion is
independent from the wealth. Choosing ζ to normalize u(1) = 1 it turns out
that u(x) = x−γ. This implies a specific form of utility function given by:
u(x) =

x1−γ if γ 6= 1
log(x) if γ = 1
• Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA): for γ → +∞, the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion is independent from wealth. In this class the utility
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function can be written as:
u(x) = −e
−Ax
A
.
• Quadratic Utility : when γ = −1 it obtains a quadratic utility function, defined
for values below ζ. If the wealth overshoots ζ then the quadratic function, still
remains concave but it decreases. This means that when individuals wealth is
above a certain level, his utility decreases. Such issue has led researchers to
avoid the quadratic utility function in their financial studies.
To sum up, it is arguable that any individual whose preferences violate von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s axioms is irrational. Therefore, the expected utility hypothesis
is that rationality can be modeled as maximizing an expected value, which given
the VNMT, can be summarized as rationality is VNM-rationality.
1.1.3 EMH: the Evidence
All the empirical researches on the market efficiency obviously have been concen-
trated on the effectiveness of its hypothesis: whether all available information is
actually fully reflected into prices. To do so, such studies have firstly inspected how
particular subsets of available information (stale information) are incorporated into
prices, then proceeding gradually. Following Malkiel and Fama (1970), it is possible
to distinguish between three types of stale information giving rise to three forms of
EMH:
Weak Form of EMH The relevant information subset is only past prices and re-
turns. The weak form of EMH, under the assumption of risk neutrality of
investor, reduces to the random walk hypothesis, which states that returns
are unpredictable using trading strategy based on past returns. This version
of market efficiency, then imply that it is not possible to earn superior risk-
adjusted profits using the series of past prices and returns.
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Semi-strong Form of EMH The relevant information subset is extended with
respect to the weak form, including any publicly available information (e.g.,
new security issues, earning announcement, announcement of stock splits).
This version of the EMH implies that it is impossible to earn superior risk-
adjusted gains based on the knowledge of publicly information, since such
information are immediately incorporated into prices as soon as they become
public.
Strong Form of EMH The relevant information set now include all the available
information, in fact, with respect to the semi-strong form, is considered the
subset of the private information, also known as inside information. The strong
form of efficient market hence implies that insiders information quickly become
known to market agents and are incorporated into prices, so it is still impossible
earn abnormal risk-adjusted profits by trading on such private information.
The semi-strong form of EMH implies the weak form of efficiency, given that past
prices and returns are a subset of the publicly information and, in turn, the strong
form of EMH, obviously, implies the semi-strong form.
When an investor wants to invest in a particular asset at time t, he forms ex-
pectations on the asset price variations between time t and time t + 1. If all past
and current information are incorporated into prices (as EMH states), only new in-
formation, unforeseeable at time t, that reach the market between time t and time
t + 1, can have an influence on prices. Then forecast errors are independent from
stale information; such property, which is often employed to test the EMH, is called
orthogonality property 11 and it is derived from the fact that expectations are formed
based on the rational expectations hypothesis. The forecast errors can be seen as
the unexpected profits (or losses) arising from the price changes between t and t+1,
therefore, under the EMH, the expected gains (or losses) equal zero. So, given the
impossibility of earning superior risk-adjusted returns exploiting the available infor-
mation, under the EMH the best investment strategy for an investor interested in
11A pair of random variables can be defined orthogonal when their covariance is zero.
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risky asset is to buy and hold the market portfolio 12: that is, a passive investment
strategy that consists in buying stocks that presents characteristics similar to those
of the market portfolio, holding them for a long period of time, regardless of short-
term fluctuations in the market. Such strategy draws its strength by the evidence
supporting that with a long time horizon, equities render a higher return than other
asset classes. Further, buy and hold strategy has tax benefits because long-term
investments tend to be taxed at a lower rate than short-term investments.
According to the EMH stale information is of no value in making money. In
this contest, researches defined making money as earning superior return after an
adjustment for risk; but this does not means that if there exists a particular trading
strategy based on stale information, that on average earns a positive cash flow over
some period of time, it is a concrete proof of market inefficiency. In fact, an investor
that earns a profit by using the mentioned strategy bears some amount of risk and
the profit is the market compensation for bearing such risk. The controversial point
then is which model is used for measuring the fairness between profits and risk.
A widely-accepted model by traditional finance paradigm is CAPM (Capital Asset
Pricing Model), which proposes to explain the formation processes of prices and
expected returns, when markets are in equilibrium; but its validity and implications
has been the subject of long debates 13.
The categorization of tests on market efficiency into the three form discussed
above (weak, semi-strong and strong form) has been used by EMH defenders to
identify the level of information at which the efficiency breaks down. It has been
found no important evidence against the EMH in the weak and semi-strong form
tests, and just limited evidence in the strong form (Malkiel and Fama 1970). To
be more precise, regarding the weak form Fama (1965) find no systematic evidence
12A market portfolio can be defined as a basket of securities large enough to be representative
of the market as a whole.
13The authors William Sharpe and John Lintner are considered the pioneer of CAPM, and
they provided the major academic contributes to such literature during the sixties. There are a
number of further development and extension of the basic CAPM model; for example, considering
a context in which there are not any risk free assets it has been developed the Black CAPM
(from the name of its founder Fischer Black). There also exist more complex versions such as the
ICAPM (intertemporal CAMP) which allow for intertemporal choices, or the so-called CCAPM
(consumption CAPM) which includes in the model consumption choices.
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of profitability of technical trading strategies, indeed in his analysis stock prices
approximately follow random walk; findings consistent with the weak form of EMH.
In order to test the semi-strong form has been developed a new methodology of
empirical finance called event studies. This testing strategy aims to assess the im-
pact of particular corporate news events on its share prices changes, and whether
prices adjust immediately to this news (as EMH states) or over a longer period.
Such events include a vast array of corporate news such as earnings and dividend
announcement, takeovers, mergers and acquisitions, share issues and repurchases
and so forth. Event studies, pioneered by Malkiel and Fama (1970), became the
principal methodology of testing EMH and a number of studies quickly appeared.
An example is given by Lo and MacKinlay (1997), they categorized the companies
based on whether the companies reported strong profits, normal earnings or a loss in
the earnings announcements. The results of this event studies show that companies
which reported good news showed higher cumulative abnormal returns, especially
on the event day (Day 0). In another similar event studies conducted by Keown
and Pinkerton (1981), is considered the case for returns to targets of takeover bids
around the announcement of the bid. They find that share prices of targets begin to
rise prior to the announcement of the bid as the news of a possible bid were incorpo-
rated into prices, and then jump on the date of the public announcement (takeover
premium). Consistent with the EMH is the result that such jump in share prices
on the announcement date is not followed by a continued trend up or a reversal
down, indicating that prices of takeover targets adjust to the public news imme-
diately. Moreover, event studies have been conducted to test other implications of
EMH, such as that prices do not react to non-information. In this context the most
relevant work is Scholes (1972) that analyzes the effect of the sales of large blocks of
shares on its prices. He relates this event with the arbitrage argument (to be precise
with the availability of close substitutes for individual securities) arguing that large
block sells should not have a material impact on the stock prices because that price
is determined by the stocks value of its close substitutes rather than supply. In fact
Scholes (1972) finds relatively small share prices reactions to block sales, which is
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consistent with the non-reaction to non-information argument.
Although the EMH has governed the academic world for a long time, such a
strong statement has been challenged at both theoretical and empirical ground dur-
ing the last thirty years. That must be the starting point to better understand the
power of behavioral finance.
1.2 Challenges to the EMH
During the Seventies, the traditional finance paradigm reaches the highest level of
its celebrity in the academic and professional fields. It represented the prevalent
economic theory, and its statement of market efficiency was almost completely sup-
ported by the empirical evidence. However, from the end of seventies onwards,
begins to appear the early works and researches questioning the validity of EMH.
In particular such contributes aim to demonstrate the existence of a large number
of financial events that could not be explained by the CAPM or are incoherent with
the efficient market hypothesis. These events are extremely related with a series
of so-called market anomalies that have been observed over the last decades, and,
although they have been heavily disapproved by the traditional finance defenders,
the evidence supporting the anomalies is very strong, bringing about the birth of a
new field of study.
1.2.1 Empirical challenges
From the chronological point of view, the most important and historically signifi-
cant challenges to the EMH were initially empirical. A first and important evidence
moved against the efficient hypothesis is that in real-world market information are
expensive instead of being freely available, and this is confirmed by the fact that no
investors or institutions used to buy and hold the market portfolio. Such portfolio
include also foreign asset, hence they usually prefer to invest in national securi-
ties, given that information about these assets and the macroeconomic context are
cheaper and easier to trace. Another relevant evidence regards how individuals
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form expectations; in fact even if all investors present rational expectations, so their
expectations are correct on average, this is not directly reflected into the market
mechanisms because: a) not all investors use the same model to determine prices;
2) the information is asymmetric 14; 3) the information could change over the time
due to agents learning and evolution.
However, the starting point in challenging the EMH has necessarily to be the
analysis of stock prices movement. Robert J. Shiller, considered to be one of the
pioneers of such analysis, has concentrated his studies principally on stock market
volatility. In a notable work published in 1981 15, he shows that stock market
prices over the past century appear to be too volatile: that is, movements in stock
prices could not be attributed to any objective new information about future real
dividends. In his analysis, Shiller compute the net present value of dividends using
a constant discount rate and measuring the uncertainty about future dividends by
the sample standard deviations of real dividends around their long-run exponential
growth path. Then Shiller conclude that: The failure of efficient market model is
thus so dramatic that it would seem impossible to attribute the failure to such things
as data errors, price index problems, or changes in tax laws . Although it became
a target of several objections, Shillers work has pointed the way to a new area of
research.
A very controversial assumption of the EMH is that, focusing on a short time
horizon, any lag in the response of prices to an event or new information is short-
lived–that is, prices instantaneously incorporate all the available information. How-
ever, many authors argue instead that stock prices adjust only slowly to new in-
formation, so to get a full view it is essential to analyze such an argument over a
long horizon. The part of literature that originates from this challenge is known as
long-term underreaction and overreaction.
14Very often in transaction happens that the seller knows more than the buyer, even if the reverse
can happen as well. This is a harmful situation because one party can take advantage of the other
partys lack of knowledge. Information asymmetry can lead to two main problems, well knows in
the financial market: adverse selction and moral hazard.
15R. J. Shiller (1981). “Do stock price move to much to be justified by subsequent changes in
dividends?” In: American Economic Review 73.1, p. 236
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Generalizing, underreaction and overreaction imply that agents may react to
new information in a way that is considered not to be appropriatein the sense of
Bayes law prescriptions. For example an overreaction occurs when, in revising their
beliefs, agents tend to overweight recent information and underweight prior data.
As Bondt and Thaler (1985) report: if stock prices systematically overshoot, then
their reversal should be predictable form past return data alone, with no use of any
accounting data such as earning , and this hypothesis imply a violation of the weak
form EMH. In their work, Bondt and Thaler (1985), form portfolios of the best and
the worst performing stocks over the three years preceding the portfolio formation,
for each year from 1933; then they compute the returns on these portfolios over the
following five years. The aim is to compare the performance of those two extreme
categories of stock: extreme looser and extreme winner. They find that over the
last half-century: loser portfolios outperform the market about thirty-six months
after portfolio formation and winner portfolios earn relatively less than the market.
Since this difference cannot be explained by an increase in the riskiness of the looser
portfolios, these results are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis.
After the above mentioned findings, a number of researches, focusing again on
short-time horizon, have provided evidence of short-term return trends. Among
these evidence, merits consideration the work of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) about
momentum 16, which identify another way to successfully predict stock returns,
based on past returns. They find that, past winners realize consistently higher
return than the past losers around their earnings announcement in the seven month
after the portfolio formation–short-term trend– but, in the following thirteen months
a reversal occurs and past losers realize higher returns.
Another anomaly observed in empirical research and consistent with the over-
reaction theory is the so called value investing. Firstly discussed by Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), value investing can be defined as the strategy of select-
16Momentum trading indicates that, in the short term, securities price is more likely to keep
moving in the same direction, helping identifying trend lines. When a momentum trader find
acceleration upward or downward in prices or earnings, he take long or short position in the hope
that momentum will continue. So such a strategy is not based on the fundamental value.
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ing stocks that trade for less than their intrinsic value. Value investors believe the
market overreacts to news, entailing stock price movement that are not justified by
changes in their fundamentals, therefore they actively seek stocks that appear to
be undervalued by the market. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) find that
firms with high Earning/Price Ratio (E/P)17, Dividend Yield (D/P)18 and Book-to-
Market Ratio19 tend to have poor past earning growth and firms with low value of
such ratios tend to have high past earning growth. Since the market overreacts to
past growth, stocks with high E/P, C/P and book to market value earn high future
returns and vice-versa. The existence of value investing strategies presents a strong
challenge to the semi-strong form of market efficiency, given that stale information
helps in predict returns, allowing earning extra-returns not bearing an higher risk,
as EMH claims.
The value investing evidence has further implications. One of this is the small
firm effect that is a market anomaly in which, companies with a small market
capitalization–or simply smaller firms–outperform larger companies. In addition,
the empirical tests on this phenomenon suggest that such superior returns have
been mostly concentrated in January. There is no evidence that, using traditional
measures of risk, small stocks should be much riskier in January. The companys
size and the coming of January are stale information–that is, they are known to
the market–therefore, using such information it is possible to earn excess return,
invalidating the semi-strong form of EMH. The January effect is part of a broader
research topic called Calendar anomalies, which the most common are the week-
end effect or Monday effect, the month changing effect, and even the Halloween
effect and the weather effect (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003) 20. Both the January
17The annual earnings of a security per share divided into its price per share. It is the inverse
of the more common price-earnings ratio. The E/P, also called earning yield, is a way to help
determine the fair value of a stock, and a measure of expected growth.
18The annual dividends of a security per share divided into its price per share. The D/P shows
how much a company pays out in dividend each year relative to its share price, and it is a way of
measuring the cash flow an investor earn for each unity invested into the equity.
19The book value of a firm compared to its market value. Book value is calculated by looking
at the firm’s historical cost, or accounting value; market value is determined in the stock market
through its market capitalization. The book-to-market ratio attempts to identify any undervalued
or overvalued securities.
20This study analyzes the relation between the weather and market exchanges. It turns out that
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effect and the small firm effect have been subjected to a critique. As Fama and
French (1993) point out, according to a so called three-factor-model–that measure
the fundamental riskiness of a stock–stock of a smaller firm must earn higher av-
erage returns precisely because, given their higher exposure to size factor, they are
fundamentally riskier. However, size effect both with the January effect seems to be
disappeared in the last years.
All of these market anomalies represent strong evidence against the traditional
finance, showing that in real market appear a number of events that are absolutely
incoherent with its fundamental laws. In conclusion, all of mentioned challenges
seem to point in the same direction, and attempt to answer the same question:
are the financial markets efficient? Although the answer is not yet univocal in the
literature, it has given rise to a new way of seeing the financial markets, which is
called Behavioral Finance.
sunny days are strongly correlated with positive daily stock returns. The inverse occurs with rainy
or snowy days.

Chapter 2
Understanding Behavioral Finance
2.1 Brief History and Foundation
Behavioral Finance is a new approach to financial market that originates from the
research into individual investors and their behavior. Although the initial challenges
were primarily empirical, not being confined only to economic field numerous theo-
retical studies have been published, including the findings and the methodology of
psychology and sociology. Behavioral finance researches, hence, being inspired by
works and findings of psychologist and sociologist, can be viewed as an interdisci-
plinary approach that merges foundations of economy, finance, psychology, sociology
and other social sciences, to better understand financial markets mechanisms (how
actually financial markets work), and psychological processes of individuals (and in
general of all participants to the market) under uncertainty. This has slowly led to
the establishment of behavioral finance as a recognized discipline.
According to the literature, the first relevant work that apply directly psychology
in understanding the evolution of financial market was Selden (1912), which was
one of the first study relating price formation process to attitude and psychological
condition of market participants: The psychological aspects of speculation may be
considered from two points of view, equally important. One question is, what effect
do varying mental attitudes of the public have upon the course of prices? How
is the character of the market influenced by psychological conditions? A second
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consideration is, how does the mental attitude of the individual trader affect his
chances of success? To what extent, and how, can he overcome the obstacles placed
in his pathway by his own hopes and fears, his timidities and his obstinacies? .
A further pioneering work was A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice by Si-
mon (1955), but, probably, the real founder of this discipline was the psychologist
Paul Slovic. His numerous studies on agents risk-misperception received a lot of
consideration by academic community, in particular because they materialize into
the Prospect Theory formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory
represents the fundamental pillar on which behavioral finance is based on, and it
is the main challenge to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern theory of expected util-
ity, which was one of the main arguments of EMH. As a crowning achievement of
its importance, Daniel Kanheman won the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Sciences for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic sci-
ence, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty .
An important contribute to the literature that has led to the development of
behavioral finance as a discipline, it has given by John Maynard Keynes that, in its
General Theory 1 studied also real-word financial markets. In particular he argue
that his famous animal spirits 2 can have a strong influence on the general course
of markets. The original passage of Keynes reads:
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability
due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our pos-
itive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than mathematical
expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of
our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be
drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal
spiritsa spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the out-
come of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative
1J. M Keynes (1936). General theory of employment, interest and money. London: Macmillan
2According to Keynes, animal spirits indicates that, actually investors decision and then action
are principally based on emotional and instinctive elements, which are not necessarily rational
and/or optimizing.
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probabilities.
Going more deeply, behavioral finance has emerged, at least in part, in response
to the unresolved issue of the EMH. Effectively, it argues that some financial phe-
nomena can be better understood using models in which agent are not fully rational,
in contrast to the market efficiency theory. At the superficial level, as Black (1986)
points out, in the real-world financial market investor trade on noise rather than
information, that is many investors react to irrelevant information in forming their
investment strategies. In fact one of the main finding of the behavioral finance is
that it shows how in a market in which both rational and irrational agents operate,
irrational trades can have a strong and long-lived impact on prices. This finding
represents one of the two building blocks of the behavioral finance and it is known in
the literature as the limits to arbitrage. Further, the evidence suggests that people
tend to deviate from the standard decision making model and such a deviation from
the rationality axiom can be even more pervasive and systematic. For that reason
behavioral finance needs to inspect to what extent agents are irrational and what
form inefficiency might take, enhancing the biases that arise when people form their
belief and preferences. Therefore the second block upon which behavioral finance
builds itself is the investor sentiment, or more generally psychology.
In next sections is provided a formal and detailed description of the two discussed
blocks. More specifically, in section 2.2 is discussed the theory underlying the limits
to arbitrage, in particular what actually causes such circumstances; sections 2.3-2.4
treat the second block, giving a description of the Prospect Theory (in section 2.3)
and a review of the main Heuristics and Biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1974) (in
the section 2.4) that have been the starting point into the development of numerous
behavioral models.
2.2 Limits to arbitrage
A strong and relevant pillar of the EMH relies on the concept of arbitrage. As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, arbitrage, strictly speaking, consists of an investment
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strategy that offers riskless profit at no cost. Arbitrageurs implement such strate-
gies to exploit temporary mispricing, driving market towards its equilibrium level.
Nevertheless, in order to implement correctly an arbitrage strategy is needed that
in the market there exist securities which, having similar features, are completely
replaceable, or at least are close substitutes. However in real financial market, be-
cause of market complexity and unpredictability almost all securities have no perfect
substitute and neither a close substitute. Hence, in these situations the arbitrageurs
are very limited, in fact without quickly available substitute their arbitraging strat-
egy could become very risky and expensive, leading to considerable delays of the
price-adjustment mechanism to the equilibrium.
One of the first works on limited arbitrage it has been Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
that develops a model describing the working of a market in which operates spe-
cialized arbitrageurs. The models results show that specialized performance-based
arbitrage could not always push prices toward their fundamental value, confirming
the presence of operating arbitrage limits and challenging one of the strongest EMH
assumptions. In addition their study raises a further issue: the author wonder if
there exist any markets that may attract more arbitrage resource than other and if
there exist, which are such markets. The answer they propose is that a great part of
the arbitrage activity (especially the professional activities, such as those involved
by hedge funds) is concentrated in a few markets. In particular in the bond market
and in the foreign exchange market, although these markets are characterized by
more extreme leverage, short-selling, and performance based fees. One possible ex-
planation of the attractiveness of these markets is that the relative values of different
fixed income instruments can be computed more easily, and the arbitrageurs, having
more confidence in assessing such value, are able to realize their arbitrage strategies
quickly. This happen principally in the bond market, where future cash flow are
(almost) certain. On the other hand, in markets such as the stock market, relative
or absolute values of different securities are more difficult to calculate, then any
arbitrage opportunities are harder to identify. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
propose a further argument to explain this attractiveness that, at a first sight, seems
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to be counterintuitive. They argue that, according to their model, the specialized
arbitrageurs tend to avoid extreme volatile markets if they are risk averse, unlike
well-diversified arbitrageurs of traditional models.
On the theoretical ground, De Long et al. (1990) try to demonstrate the riskiness
of arbitrage strategies and that such strategies more often increase disequilibrium
in stock market instead of remove it. In fact arbitrageurs rarely earn riskless profits
given that they need great amount of financial resources to run their strategies, in
particular to cover temporary losses they could bear. The authors focus particularly
on the limits of arbitrageurs in exploiting noise traders misperception. Arbitrageurs
are likely to be risk averse and to have reasonably short horizons so that their
willingness to take positions against noise traders is limited. One source of risk
that limits the power of arbitrage is fundamental risk, even when arbitrageurs have
infinite horizons (Campbell and Kyle 1993). But there is another important source
of risk, that De Long et al. (1990) call noise trader risk, that is: the risk that
noise traders’ beliefs will not revert to their mean for a long time and might in the
meantime become even more extreme. If noise traders today are pessimistic about
an asset and push its price down, an arbitrageur buying this asset has to take into
account that in the near future noise traders might become even more pessimistic and
drive the price down further. If the arbitrageur has to liquidate his position before
the price could rise, he suffers a loss. Because the arbitrageur is risk-averse, being
afraid by this potential loss, he could assume more cautious position than those
predicted by EMH hypothesis, for example diversifying his investment portfolios,
limiting his arbitrage strategy. Then the unpredictability of noise traders’ future
opinions limits the arbitrage, pushes prices to diverge significantly from fundamental
values even when there is no fundamental risk.
The empirical research, in order to find any evidence of limited arbitrage strate-
gies, has been conducted focusing particularly on the presence of persistent mispric-
ing. Of course, if arbitrage were not limited, the mispricing would quickly disappear;
then, on the other hand, any example of persistent mispricing is an immediate ev-
idence of limited arbitrage. The question is to establish when a deviation of price
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from its fundamental value can be defined with certainty as a mispricing. As Malkiel
and Fama (1970) claims, any test on mispricing inevitably implies a joint test on
mispricing and on the model of proper discounting; in this way is it possible to assert
that a given price substantially differs from its discounted future cash flow.
An important and immediate evidence of deviations of stock prices from its
fundamental value, and therefore of the operating limits to arbitrage, is represented
by a particular phenomenon that appears when a stock is added to an index. The
study of Harris and Gurel (1986) about the index inclusion shows that after the
inclusion of a stock into to the S&P500 index, the price of the stock suddenly
jumps by an average of 3.5%, butand this is the issuemuch of this increase remains
permanent. Such price jump is a clear evidence of mispricing, since the fundamental
value of the stock does not change after the inclusion. This is also a strong evidence
of limited arbitrage: in fact, an arbitrageur, in trying to exploit this anomaly, should
take short position on the stock included in the index and at the same time buy
a good substitute. In implementing such strategy, however the arbitrageur faces a
further risk: that is, whatever causes the initial price jump may continue and cause
the price to still rise (especially in the short run). An additional support to such
findings is provided by the work of Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), which shows
that the jump in price can be even more prominent for those stock which have the
worst substitutes (in this case the arbitrage strategy is riskiest).
Remaining on the empirical ground, among the numerous evidence on market
price deviations that almost certainty represent a case of mispricing, the most strik-
ing is the case of Royal Dutch and Shell Transport, named Twin shares case, that
are two securities essentially identical, being projections of the same entity, but
one has been heavily undervalued relative to the other. The two companies, Royal
Dutch and Shell Transport, generated by the same institution in 1907 but at the
time completely independent companies, agreed to merge their interests on a 60/40
basis while remaining separate entities. Shares of Royal Dutch, which are primarily
traded in the USA and in the Netherlands, are a claim to 60% of the total cash flow
of the two companies, while Shell, which trades primarily in the UK, is a claim to
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Figure 2.1: Log deviations from Royal Dutch/Shell parity. This figure shows on
a percentage basis the deviations from theoretical parity of Royal Dutch and Shell
shares. Source: Froot and Dabora (1999).
the remaining 40%. If prices equal fundamental value, the market value of Royal
Dutch equity should always be 1.5 times the market value of Shell equity; but rather
the differential has been considerably high for a long time. The real problem is that
whatever investor sentiment is causing one share to be undervalued relative to the
other, this could also cause that share to become even more undervalued in the
short term. To be more specific, an arbitrageur buying undervalued Royal Dutch
shares on the beginning of 1983 (10% undervalued), would have seen them drop still
further in value over the next six months, as it is shown in the Figure 2.1.
In addition to all the discussed evidence, the implementation costs of an arbi-
trage strategy such as commissions, bid-ask spreads and short sale constraints, can
make it less attractive to exploit a mispricing. In particular, since short-selling in
often essential to the arbitrage process, fees charged for borrowing stocks and le-
gal constraints to short sales can be the most limiting costs of arbitrage. Among
implementation costs are often included the cost of finding and learning about a
mispricing as well as the cost of the resources needed to exploit it.
The limits of arbitrage strategies give a strong contribute in understanding the
reasons of unbalanced reactions of prices to news and information, leading to mar-
ket inefficiency. One of the strongest pillars of EMH seems to collapse under the
numerous challenges and evidences moved against it.
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2.3 Prospect Theory
Behavioral finance research, from the likes of Richard Thaler, Robert Shiller, and
Daniel Kahneman amongst others, has shown over the last three decades that eco-
nomic agents and financial markets are not fully rational. Humans are not as smart
as standard economic theory would have us believe. Given these findings, much
value can be obtained from investigating whether incorporating behavioral based
preference patterns has substantial influence on investor’s optimal behavior. Hu-
mans dont always behave according to the assumptions of utility theory in that
they do not search to identify all possible outcomes or they are not always able to
assign accurate probabilities to these outcomes.
VNM axioms violation
For a long time the axioms of Von Neumann-Morgernstern Theory has been widely
accepted by the entire academic world. From the Seventies onwards a number
of researches, often conducted by psychologist and sociologist, have demonstrated
that under certain conditions, individuals behaviors systematically violate expected
utility theory prescriptions, especially the independence axiom and the transitivity
axiom. In their notable work on the Prospect Theory, that posed the basis for
subsequent develops on behavioral finance, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose
a social experiment on the violation of the independence axiom, based on the famous
Allaiss paradox. In this experiment, subjects have to face to gambles; each one
consists of two different alternatives. The first gamble considers
Option A Win 2500$ with probability of 0.33, 2400$ with probability 0.66 and 0$
with probability of 0.01. The expected value of this option is: 0.33 2500 +
0.66 2400 + 0.01 0 = 2409.
Option B Win a sure amount of 2400$.
The second gamble considers
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Option C Win: 2500$ with probability of 0.33 and 0$ with probability of 0.67.
The expected value of this option is: 0.33 2500 + 0.67 0 = 825.
Option D Win: 2400$ with probability of 0.34 and 0$ with probability of 0.66.
The expected value of this option is: 0.34 2400 + 0.66 0 = 816.
According to the VNMT, in choosing between different gambles people should take
into account not only the expected value but rather the expected utility of the
alternatives. In the sample examined, the authors find that the in the first gamble
the 82% prefers option B and in the second gamble the 83% prefers option C. Such
results are extremely in contrast with VNMT because, since the utility of no money
equals zero, in the first gamble the choice of option B implies that
U(2400) > 0.33 U(2500) + 0.66 U(2400) .
The independence axiom states that, is assessing different gamble, individuals ignore
the shared outcomes, in this case 2400, so that it should be
0.34 U(2400) > 0.33 U(2500) ,
but choosing option C in the second gambles implies that
0.34 U(2400) < 0.33 U(2500) .
It is evident that the preferences of individuals are conflicting, given that choos-
ing option B in the first gambles should imply the preference for option D in the
second gamble. Comparing the two alternatives, seems that individuals are likely
to eliminate the probability of 0.66 of winning 2400; if independence axiom holds
this should not change the order of preferences, in contrast with the evidence of the
experiment.
A possible explanation for such paradox, proposed by Savage, is that: in the first
gamble, the probability of winning a great amount does not offset the probability
of win zero, even if such probability is very low. In the second gamble, given that
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the winning of great amount has similar probabilities, individuals often prefer the
option that offers the greatest amount. On the other hand, Kahneman e Tversky
propose that, eliminating the probability of 0.66 of winning 2400, individuals could
be less willing to undertake the gamble, especially when such exclusion turns an
option with a certain gain (option B) into an option with uncertain gain (option
D). Such impact could be less evident when the starting option (option A) has high
probability of winning, although it is not certain. Such phenomenon is often called
certainty effect.
Prospect Theory
Of all the non-EU theories, prospect theory may be the most promising for financial
applications. Prospect theory has no aspirations as a normative theory: it simply
tries to capture peoples attitudes to risky gambles as parsimoniously as possible. In-
deed, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue convincingly that normative approaches
are doomed to failure, because people routinely make choices that are simply impos-
sible to justify on normative grounds, in that they violate dominance or invariance.
Unlike others conventional theories, prospect theory has two fundamental charac-
teristics: the presence of an editing period and a reference point in assessing gains
and losses. For what concern the editing, individuals usually reformulate the shape
of gambles they are offered in order to make their interpretation easier, often using
mental shortcuts (heuristics). Regarding the procedure of assessing gains and losses,
individuals tend to observe outcomes anchoring to a subjective reference point such
as current or future expected wealth, instead of on their absolute values, as VNMT
states. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) lay out the original version of prospect theory,
designed for gambles with at most two non-zero outcomes. They state that individ-
uals when choosing between different gambles focus on gains and losses, picking up
the one with the highest value. To give an example, assume that people are asked
to choose between the following two options:
Option A Get 500$ with probability of 0.5 and get nothing with the same proba-
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Figure 2.2: Value fuction. Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
bility. The expected value is: 0.5 500 + 0.5 0 = 250.
Option B Get a sure amount of 250$.
B was the more popular choice. The same subjects were then asked to choose
between
Option C Lose 500$ with probability of 0.5 and lose nothing with the same prob-
ability. The expected value is: 0.5 − 500 + 0.5 0 = −250.
Option D Lose a sure amount of 250$.
This time, C was more popular. Note that the two problems are identical in terms
of their final wealth positions and yet people choose differently. The subjects are
apparently focusing only on gains and losses. Indeed, when they are not given any
information about prior winnings, they choose B over A and C over D. Such different
approach to gains and losses is well represented by the so-called value function.
Looking at Figure 2.2 the shape of the value function v it is concave in the
domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Put simply, people are risk
averse over gains, and risk-seeking over losses; the v function also has a inflection
point at the origin, indicating a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains, a feature
known as loss aversion. To be more precise the regret people faces when suffer losses
is greater than the pleasure in getting a profit of the same amount.
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Figure 2.3: Weighting function. Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
Once represented the decisional problem, people assign a value to the gamble, in
order to take a given decision, using the value function v and a weighting function
of probability pi. Given a lottery L with two possible outcomes x1 and x2, its value
is given by a weighted average
V (L) = pi(p1) v(x1) + pi(p2) v(x2) .
In assessing such lotteries, unlike classic expected utility theories, individual use
subjective weighting function of probability, which is a function of his current wealth
and his risk attitude, instead of using objective probabilities of uncertain outcomes.
The main feature of the weighting function of probability is that weights assigned to
outcomes could differ from effective probabilities. As shown in Figure 2.3 weighting
function is an increasing function that takes value zero in the case of impossible
events and 1 in the case of sure event; but for intermediate probabilities the function
is nonlinear. In fact small probabilities are overweighted, so that pi(p) > p. This is
deduced form Kahneman and Tversky finding that
• individuals prefer 5000$ with probability of 0.001 to 5 with probability of 1,
• individuals prefer −5 with probability of 1 to −5000 with probability of 0.001,
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together with the earlier assumption that the value function is concave in the domain
of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Moreover, people are more sensitive to
differences in probabilities at higher probability levels. For example
• individuals prefer 3000$ with probability of 1 to a gamble which pays 4000
with probability of 0.8 and 0 with probability of 0.2,
• individuals prefer a gamble which pays 4000 with probability of 0.2 and 0 with
probability of 0.8 to 3000 with probability of 0.25,
this means that 20% jump in probability from 0.8 to 1 is more evident than the 20%
jump from 0.2 to 0.25. In particular, people place much more weight on outcomes
that are certain relative to outcomes that are merely probable.
The particular shape of the value function allows also to explain a phenomenon
which is often called reflection effect, that is: when people face two different but
symmetrical decisional problem, one expressed in terms of gains and the other one
in terms of losses, tend to choose sure outcomes in the former problem and risky
outcomes in the latter. Further, prospect theory could explain why people made
different choices in situations with identical final wealth levels. This represents an
important feature of the theory, namely that it can accommodate the effects of
problem description, named framing effect. Framing refers to the way a problem
is posed for the decision maker. Numerous works demonstrate that 30/40% shift
in preferences depends on the formulation of the problem. To give an example,
suppose that a serious disease has infected 600 individuals. People are asked to
choose between two options
Option A spread a vaccine among population rescuing 200 people certainly;
Option B rescue 600 with a probability of 0.33 and none with a probability of 0.67.
A was the more popular choice. The same subjects were then asked to choose
between
Option C let certainly die 400 people;
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Option D none will die with a probability of 0.33 and 600 will die with a probability
of 0.67.
This time, D was more popular. In this example it is evident the two decisional
problems offer the same outcomes, but change the way a problem is posed, so that
when people face problem expressed in term of positive outcomes tend to be risk-
averse; conversely they tend to be risk-seeker when problem is posed in term of
negative outcomes.
2.4 Heuristic and Biases
The behavioral approach towards financial decision making comes from the fact that
individuals have a bounded rationality in their ability of make optimal judgments and
choices. Two direct consequence of this bounded rationality are decision heuristics
and cognitive biases. Organizing and presenting these heuristics and biases is not
easy task, given that they arise from a wide range of mechanisms. A traditional
approach describes decisions as choices between risky opportunities. A decision
maker forms beliefs about probabilities of events and about utilities or values of
outcomes. Finally individual makes preferences between risky options. Bias can
arise both in the process of forming beliefs and of making the decision, so that a
bias can be defined as a departure from the optimal, or rational behavior.
Heuristics mental rules, strategies for processing information to reach quickly a
result, not necessarily optimal; hence a heuristic can be defined as a mental process
which tends to produce efficient solutions to difficult problems by restricting the
search through the space of possible solutions; the restriction on search is based on
evaluation of the structure of the problem (Braunstein 1976).
However, these heuristics can also lead to systematic biases in judgment. Three
heuristics to which people are particularly susceptible are the following: representa-
tiveness, availability, and conservtism and overconfidence.
It could be argued that individual biases and heuristics are not so relevant, since
individuals differ and in equilibrium their biases should cancel each other out. How-
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ever behavioral researchers state that some bias can be systematic and persistent,
and repeated pattern can also be used as a basis to predict the behavior of others,
which is very important in the context of financial markets. Real-world financial
markets may be a strong example where rational behavior does not necessarily imply
success. The following list presents a number of most known heuristics and biases
found in the literature.
2.4.1 Ambiguity Aversion
Ambiguity aversion refers to the preference for known risks over unknown risks
(uncertainty). A first conceptualization of such heuristic is provided by the Ellsbergs
paradox. In this experiment subjects are presented with two urns. Urn 1 has exactly
50 red and 50 black balls. Urn 2 contains 100 red and black balls, but in an unknown
ratio. Subjects must choose an urn to draw from, if they draw from urn 1 they will
receive a 100 payoff if the ball drawn is red and 0 if the black ball is drawn; if
subject choose urn 2 they will receive 100 payoff if the ball drawn is red and 0 if the
black ball is drawn. The most popular choice was the first urn, which outcome has
known probabilities, confirming that individuals prefer to bear known risks rather
than unknown risk.
2.4.2 Anchoring and Adjustment
Adjustment and anchoring is a heuristic which starts from an initial value, given by
the problem formulation or by some partial computation and then adjusts it towards
the final value. The problem with this heuristic is that the adjustment is often
insufficient, which means that the final value will be heavily anchored to the initial
value. The consequence of this heuristic is that people overestimate conjunction
of events, with high individual probabilities, and they underestimate a disjunction
of events, with low individual probabilities. In financial markets anchoring is very
common. Market participants, not being available better information, can base their
assessment on opinions or attitudes of friends or experts. Even data and forecast
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that initially appear to be unrealistic can still have an anchoring effect (Goldberg and
Nitzsch von 1999). Campbell and Shiller (2001) define anchoring as the tendency
of being influenced by hints; for example, in filling in a survey, individual tend to
anchor their answer to the default value provided by survey, in particular in case of
lack of information or recall.
2.4.3 Availability
Availability is a judgmental heuristics in which a frequency/probability of an event
is assessed on how easy it is to recall its examples, how easy it is to mentally
construct such examples or how easy it is to associate two similar examples. In
Kahneman and Tversky (1974), the authors analyze availability arguing that in
assessing possible outcomes of future and uncertain events, individuals try to recall
their experience relative to such event; but they do not recover information with
more informative power, rather those that has had the strongest impact on their
emotion or that are occurred most frequently. In Shefrin (2000), the authors report
an experiment in which people were asked: what causes the greatest number of
deaths in U.S, murder or heart attack? The most popular answer was murder. To
answer this question people try to recall information by media, since media tend
to put more emphasis on murder than on infarct, people asses such information as
more frequent. Actually in U.S, heart attack is the main cause of death. In another
study, subjects were asked to compare the frequencies of words starting with letter
r, and words that have letter r in the third position. Even though the latter are
more frequent, the participants opted for the first case, because it is much easier
to mentally construct words by using their first letter. Availability heuristic is very
frequent in financial markets; in particular investors tend to trust companies which
receive positive feedback by experts and analysts, because of the availability of a
great number of good information about such company.
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2.4.4 Conservatism
Conservatism refers to the tendency of individuals to change and adjust their be-
liefs only slowly in the face of new evidence/information. This is strictly related to
Anchoring and Adjustment heuristic. In a narrow sense conservatism means that
people are not perfect Bayesian updaters, in the sense their response to new infor-
mation goes in the right direction but it is insufficient in amount (Edwards 1968).
In term of financial markets conservatism heuristic is associated with the underre-
action evidence. When people use conservatism heuristic, they might underestimate
the full informative power of news, for example about earning announcement, prob-
ably because they believe that it is a temporary information, and then adjust their
assessment only slowly and partially to the new information.
2.4.5 Overconfidence
Overconfident, also known as self-attibution bias, is an heuristic in which people,
in making their predictions, set confidence bands overly narrow, which means they
get surprised more frequently than they anticipated (Shefrin 2000). This type of
overconfidence is known as miscalibration. A more general definition of overconfi-
dence is the one by which people overestimate their own capabilities, usually with
respect to capabilities of other people on average. In financial markets overconfident
investors are considered those who actively trade in such a way that the difference
between the stocks they buy and those they sell does not cover transaction costs
(Odean and Barber 1999). Often young market operators that have experienced
excellent performances tend to be more confident in their trading capabilities and
become hyper-sure.
2.4.6 Representativeness
Representativeness bias occurs when it is required to assess the probability of an
object A belonging to a class or process B. The heuristic rule says that if object A
has similar essential properties to the class B, or it reflects the salient features of the
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process B, then the probability of A originating from B is judged as high, and vice
versa (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). For example, in face of a detailed description
of an individual that fit with a particular kwon profession, people tend to substan-
tially overestimate the probability that such individual belong to that profession,
underestimating the statistical evidence that only a small probability of population
could belong to that profession (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998). The prob-
lem with this heuristics is that it persists even when facts, which should affect the
judgment of probabilities, are introduced. For instance, Kahneman and Tversky
(1974) showed that representativeness is insensitive to the prior probability of out-
comes, when (uninformative) description is provided. Furthermore, it is insensitive
to the sample size, when people estimate the probability related to the sample ran-
domly drawn from a large population, based on the similarity with the population
parameter. According to Shefrin (2000), representativeness heuristic is a judgment
based on stereotypes. Representativeness is high when an observation fits the pat-
tern. Some of the most important applications of this heuristic are in predicting
the market, picking stocks, choosing mutual funds, selecting money managers, and
investing in initial public offerings (IPOs) (Shefrin 2000). Often related to the over-
reaction evidence, a financial example of the representativeness is the winner-loser
effect documented in Bondt and Thaler (1985). Investors who use the representa-
tiveness heuristic are too optimistic about past winners, and too pessimistic about
past losers. This creates a temporary mispricing (overvaluation of past winners, and
undervaluation of past losers), which is eventually reversed, as the portfolio of past
losers outperforms the market, while the winners portfolio underperforms. Another
example is a misapplication of regression to the mean, which predicts that future
returns will be closer to the historical average. However, experts and analysts often
predict that after having a long period of high returns they are more likely to be
below, which is a wrong prediction in positively autocorrelated financial markets
(Shefrin 2000).
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2.4.7 Others Heuristics
Conditional Probability Fallacy
Conditional probability fallacy means confusing conditional probability p(a|b) with
p(b|a), and can be in a broader view considered as the fallacy of confusing cause and
effect. Goldberg and Nitzsch von (1999) give a financial example where the prob-
ability of a stock market crash in October is overestimated based on the historical
observation that most stock crashes occurred in October.
Endowment Effect
Once a person comes to possess a good, the person immediately values it more.
Frame Dependence
A frame is the form used to describe a decision problem, and frame dependence
means that the form is relevant for behavior (Shefrin 2000).
Gamblers Fallacy
The gamblers fallacy is the false belief that if deviations from expected behavior
are observed in repeated independent trials of some random process, then these
deviations are likely to be offset by opposite deviations in the future. In the case of
a fair coin tosses, this fallacy would manifest as thinking that the coin is more likely
to toss heads after having tossed tails a number of times in a row. See also the law
of small numbers and representativeness.
Law of Small Numbers
Misapplication of the law of large numbers to small samples is also known as the
law of small numbers or a gamblers fallacy. The phenomenon is related to repre-
sentativeness heuristic - people under-use base-rate information when forming their
beliefs (Kahneman and Tversky 1974). In the financial context, people underesti-
mate how often a good financial analyst will be wrong a few times in a row, and
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underestimate how often a clueless analyst will be right a few times in a row (Rabin
1998).
Money Illusion
A natural way for people to think about money is in terms of nominal rather than
inflation-adjusted values (Shefrin 2000). Thus, under hyperinflation people will view
nominal wage increase more favourably than it really is.
Regret
Regret is the emotion experienced for not having made the right decision. It is the
feeling of responsibility for loss (Shefrin 2000). In a financial context the minimiza-
tion of possible future regret plays an important role in portfolio allocation. It is
also related with preference for buying stock that often distribute dividends, because
selling a stock that may rise in the future carries a huge potential for regret.
Status Quo Bias
People prefer status quo to changes that involve losing some goods, even when these
losses are offset by gains (Knetsch and Sinden 1984). It is related to the endowment
effect and loss aversion.
2.5 Evident Anomalies
A financial anomaly can be defined as a price behavior pattern that is inconsistent
with the predictions of traditional efficient markets and rational expectations asset
pricing theory. For ease of review, anomalies have tended to be sorted according to
various criteria. An initial distinction may be made in terms of who the anomaly in-
volves, namely, a difference can be drawn between macro-perspective puzzlesanoma-
lies regarding the whole marketand micro-perspective puzzlesanomalies related to
2.5 Evident Anomalies 41
the investment decisions of a single individual 3
2.5.1 Equity Premium Puzzle
Among macro anomalies that involve the behavior of aggregate stock markets, the
equity premium puzzle has been the most observed and studied. Roughly speaking
the equity premium can be defined as the difference between stock market returns
and Treasury bond yield, and historically the average returns on equity has far
exceeded the average returns on bond. This large differential in average yields, not
being explained by the presence of transactions costs, liquidity constraints and other
frictions, it has called equity premium puzzle. The term equity premium puzzle has
been firstly presented in Mehra and Prescott (1985), studying the U.S. aggregate
stock market between 1889 and 1978. In Campbell and Cochrane (1999) the authors,
using annual data from 1871−1993, reports that the average log return on the S&P
500 index is 3.9% higher than the average log return on short-term commercial paper.
It is not an easy task explain why investors appear to be unwilling to hold stocks even
though securities appear to be an attractive asset, in particular it seem that they
demand a substantial risk premium in order to hold the market supply. According
to traditional finance, investors should be extremely risk-averse to demand such risk
premium, so that although stocks seem to be very profitable, investors consider them
too risky to being the main investment choice for their portfolio.
In trying to explain the equity premium puzzle, behavioral finance has pursued
two approaches: one relies on prospect theory and the other one on ambiguity aver-
sion. The approach linking prospect theory to equity premium puzzle has been firstly
presented in Benartzi and Thaler (1993). They study how an investor with prospect
theory- type preferences allocates his financial wealth between treasury bonds and
stocks. Prospect theory argues that when choosing between gambles, people com-
pute the gains and losses for each one and select the one with the highest prospective
utility. In a financial context, this suggests that people may choose a portfolio allo-
3We do not attempt to list all of the documented anomalies in their entirety. We only briefly
outline the most important observations to contextualize further arguments.
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cation by computing, for each allocation, the potential gains and losses in the value
of their holdings, and then taking the allocation with the highest prospective utility.
The key point is to study how often investors evaluate their portfolio. Benartzi
and Thaler (1993) find that if an investor who calculates gains and losses in his
portfolio every day, since on daily basis stocks go up and down very often, the loss
aversion may makes stocks more unattractive than for an investor who evaluate is
portfolio in longer horizons, for example every ten years. This combination of loss
aversion and frequent evaluation, often called myopic loss aversion, lead investors to
demand a high risk premium as compensation. The authors also address the issue
for professional investors, which could have almost infinite investment horizons, so
that they should build their portfolio only with stocks that yield higher returns.
They argue that although institutional investors have longer investment horizons,
mangers actions are evaluated each years, so their horizons can be actually reduces
to a years.
One of the first applications of ambiguity aversion to equity premium puzzle
is in Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003). In this approach, the agent has a
reference probability distribution in mind, but wants to ensure that his decisions
are good ones even if the reference model is misspecified to some extent; the agent
essentially tries to guard against a worst-case misspecification. In a related study
Maenhout (2004) shows that if investors are concerned that their model of stock
returns is misspecified, they will demand a substantially higher equity premium as
compensation for the perceived ambiguity in the probability distribution. He notes,
however, that ambiguity aversion is not able to explain the full 3.9% equity premium;
then ambiguity aversion is only a partial resolution of the puzzle.
2.5.2 Closed-end Funds Puzzle
Closed-end funds differ from more familiar open-end funds in that they only issue
a fixed number of shares. These shares are then traded on exchanges: an investor
who wants to buy a share of a closed-end fund must go to the exchange and buy it
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from another investor. By contrast, should he want to buy a share of an open-end
fund, the fund would create a new share and sell it to him at its net asset value,
or NAV, the per share market value of its asset holdings. The central puzzle about
closed-end funds is that fund share prices differ from NAV. The typical fund trades
at a discount to NAV of about 10% on average, although the difference between
price and NAV varies substantially over time. When closed-end funds are created,
the share price is typically above NAV; when they are terminated, either through
liquidation or open-ending, the gap between price and NAV closes. A number of
rational explanations for this puzzle have been proposed, such as expenses, tax
liabilities, but none of them can satisfactorily explain all aspects of the puzzle. Lee,
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) propose a simple behavioral view of these closed-end
fund puzzles. They argue that some of the individual investors who are the primary
owners of closed-end funds are noise traders, exhibiting irrational fluctuation in
their expectations about future fund returns. Sometimes they are too optimistic,
while sometimes they are too pessimistic, so that changes in their sentiment have a
strong impact on fund share price. In fact owners of closed-end funds have to face
two sources of risk: fluctuations in the value of the funds assets, and fluctuations
in noise trader sentiment. If this second risk is systematic, rational investors will
demand compensation for it. In other words, they will require that the funds shares
trade at a discount to NAV.
2.5.3 Naive Diversification
Among anomalies that involve investment decision of single individual, Benartzi and
Thaler (2001) find that in real-world market people do diversify their portfolio but
in a naive way. In their experiment, the authors ask subjects to make allocation
decision in each of the following three conditions:
• choose between a stock fund and a bond fund;
• choose between a stock fund and a balance fund;
44 Understanding Behavioral Finance
• choose between a bond fund and a balanced fund.
They find that a 50 : 50 split across the two fund is the most popular choice in all
three cases, although this leads to a very different effective choices between stock
and bonds. Many people seem to use a simple allocating strategy that consists
in allocating 1/n of their wealth or savings to each of the n available investment
options.
2.5.4 Impact of Excessive Trading
One of the clearest assumptions of efficiency hypothesis is that there should be
very little trading. But, in contrast to this prediction in real financial markets the
volume of trading is very high, or, put it differently, investors trade more than can
be justified on rational grounds. Barber and Odean (2000), analyzing the trading
activity from 1991 to 1996 they find that after taking trading costs into account,
the average return of investors in their sample is well below the return of standard
benchmarks, although this underperformance is in great part due to transaction
costs. A behavioral explanation for such anomalies is given by the overconfidence
heuristic: people believe that they have information strong enough to justify a trade,
whereas in fact the information is too weak. This hypothesis immediately predicts
that people who are more overconfident will trade more and, because of transaction
costs, earn lower returns.
2.6 Behavioral Models: An Overview
During the past thirty-years a lot of behavioral studies have been focused on under-
standing the prices formation process and its dynamics. However, for the purpose of
this work, the relevant studies are those who analyze how prices incorporate infor-
mation (public or private) and the consequence this process provokes on the prices
path. In particular, these studies provide theoretical models to explain two main
topics of the behavioral finance: that is, positive short-term returns autocorrelation
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and negative long-run returns autocorrelation 4; that, reflecting different agents cog-
nitive biases, represent the results of several empirical studies upon which behavioral
finance has built the great part of its challenges to the EMH. In this section is given
an overview of three of the most relevant behavioral models.
2.6.1 Barberis, Shleifer, Vishny - A Model of Investor Sen-
timent
Aims In this work, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (hereafter BSV) pro-
pose a parsimonious model of investor sentimentof how investors form beliefsthat is
consistent with the available statistical evidence of two pervasive regularities: under-
reaction and overreaction. The underreaction evidence shows that over of perhaps
1-12 months, news is incorporated only slowly into prices, which tend to exhibit
positive autocorrelations (good news has power in predicting positive returns in the
future). Instead, the overreaction evidence shows that over longer time horizons
of about 3-5 years, securities that have had a long series of good news, receiving
extremely high valuations, tend to become overpriced, resulting in a later low aver-
age returns because such high valuations, on average, return to the mean (negative
long-term autocorrelation). Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)sustain that this
interpretation of stock prices regularities consistent with two important behavioral
heuristics: representativeness and conservatism. The representativeness bias is de-
fined as the tendency to view some events as representative of specific class, ignoring
the laws of probability in the process and confusing weight and strength of news.
Therefore is the representativeness that leads investor to overreact over the long
time horizon and that could explain the negative autocorrelation of prices. On the
other hand, conservatism, which is defined as the slow updating of models in face
of new evidence, leads investor to underestimate the information content of new
signals, generating underreaction.
4Commonly in the literature, positive autocorrelation is associated with the phenomenon of
underreaction and the negative autocorrelation is associated with the overreaction; however a lot
of studies sustain that such association is not necessarily so stringent (Hong and Stein 1999)
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The Model In their model Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) consider a unique
representative, risk-neutral investor with constant discount rate and that its beliefs
reflect the consensus. In this simple economy there is only one security which pays
100% of its earning as dividends and the authors suppose that the earning stream
follows a random walk, but the investor does not realize it. In fact, investor thinks
that world moves between two states or regimes 5. When the world is in the first
regime, earnings are determined by Model 1, in which earning are mean-reverting
6, when, instead, the world is in the second regime, Model 2 determines earnings,
following a trend 7. Further, the investor believes that there is an underlying regime-
switching process 8 that determines which regime the world is in at any time. The
transition probabilities associated with Model 1 and Model 2 is fixed in the investors
mind, so the investor, in order to value the security, uses the earning stream he has
observed to update his beliefs about which regime is generating earning, following
the Bayesian rule. In this way, if the investor observes a series of positive earning
shock, he believes that Model 2 is generating current earnings and, since the regime-
switching probability is low, in his mind Model 2 is also likely to generate earning
in the next period. But given that earnings follow a random walk, they are equally
likely to go up or down, therefore this means that the investor is overreacting to
earning shock. On the contrary, underreaction occurs in this model when the investor
believes that actually Model 2 is generating earnings. For example, if the investor
observes a positive earning shock, he believes that it is more likely to be followed
by a negative shock but, since he is using the wrong model in forecasting earning,
his reaction to the following shocks will be less than proportional 9.
Challenges Although the BSV model is particularly suitable in explaining in-
vestors reaction to the stream of earning shock, it has been challenged in its capa-
5Both regimes are modeled as Markov process: that is, in each states the change in earnings in
period t depends only on the change in period t− 1.
6Stock prices tendency to be attracted by their long-term mean value.
7Earnings follows a monotonically increasing or decreasing.
8Even this underlying process is specified as a Markov process.
9See the original authors work to get an analytical treatise of such proposed arguments.
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bility of explaining event-based regularities (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995).
For example, if we assume a security which does not pay out its dividends or divi-
dends growth is negative; its price falls down on the announcement of the cut and
then continues falling afterwards, generating underreaction. This finding is consis-
tent with the Model 1, but a dividends cut often occur after a record of negative
shock, so according the BSV model this string should induce investor in believing
in the Model 2 and the dividends cut, being another bad news, would causes an
overreaction rather than underreaction 10. The defender of the BSV model reply
to this challenge arguing that an isolated information event such as a dividend cut,
even though can be classified as good or bad news, it generates an isolated reaction.
From this point of view, investor form forecast of earnings using a time series of
this variable, observing a series of news, therefore they do not include the isolated
information event in the forecast. Under this interpretation the model is consistent
with underreaction, leading to underweight the different type of information.
Another limit of the BSV model is that it does not account for extreme growth
stocks behavior. The empirical evidence shows that stock that have had several
consecutive years of positive earnings news generates underreaction, conversely the
discussed model would implies an overreaction.
The BSV model differs from other behavioral models because in their framework
the investor never changes its way of interpreting data: that is, even after a long
stream of earnings news, he does not change the model he is using to forecast
earnings. The only sense in which he learns from the data is to understand which
of the two regime is currently generating earnings.
10As a consequence of the representativeness bias.
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2.6.2 Daniel, Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam - Investor Psy-
chology and Security Market under- and Overreac-
tions
Aims The Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) model (hereafter DHS)
propose a detailed theory of investor psychology that is consistent with the empirical
evidence of underreaction and overreaction. This model differs from the BSV model
for two reasons: firstly, they differ in the meaning of under- and overreaction, in
fact they assume that investors overreact to private information but unederreact to
public signals; secondly, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) theory (and
then the explanation of the two regularities) is based on investor overconfidence and
variations in confidence arising from biased self-attribution. An investor is overcon-
fident in the sense that he overestimates the precision of his private information
signal, but not of public information signals. If the investor overestimates his ability
to generate information or to elaborate specific data, then he will tend to underesti-
mate his forecast errors; so the more the investor is overconfident about the signals
he has analyzed, the more he will be overconfident about the information he has
generated, neglecting the public one. Regarding the self-attribution bias is defined
as the tendency of the investors confidence to grow up when public information is in
agreement with his information, but not to fall when public information contradicts
his information. In fact people tend to credit themselves for past success, and blame
external factor for their failures.
Unlike the previous discussed model, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(1998) show that stock prices overreact to private information signals and underreact
to public signals. They find that the overreaction is due to the overconfidence about
the private signals relative to the prior, but as more public information arrive, this
deviation of the price in partially corrected (underreaction). Then they argue that
this overreaction-correction pattern is consistent with the empirical evidence of long-
term negative autocorrelation of stock returns.
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The Model In Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) model, agents are
quasi-rational investors in that they follow the Bayesian law except for their over-
weighting private information signals. They consider the agents as belonging to
two representative categories: the informed, I, that are those who receive the signal
and are risk-neutral, and the uninformed, U, that are those who do not receive the
signal and are risk-averse. At time 0 each agent has the identical prior beliefs and
is endowed with a number of security shares and a risk-free numeraire. At time 1
the informed receive a noisy private signal and start trading with the uninformed
At time 2 arrives the noisy public signal as well, and there is a further trading ses-
sion. At the last time 3 arrives the conclusive public information, the security pays
dividends and consumption occurs.
Assuming a constant confidence level, the risky asset has a terminal value, which
the authors assume to be normally distributed, so the private information received by
the informed at time 1 is equal to the terminal value plus an error. The uninformed
correctly assess the error variance, but the informed underestimate. At time 2, on
the contrary, a public signal arrive, his noise term is independent of the terminal
value of the asset and of the time 1 error, and both informed and uninformed
correctly asses its variance. Thus, the overconfidence in the private signals at time
1 leads to an overreaction of the stock price to this new information, but at time
2 the public information arrives and such deviation is partially corrected, till to
completely disappear with the arrival of the last public signal. This result, which
is consistent with model assumptions, leads Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(1998) to state the following proposition:
If investors are overconfident, then:
1. Price moves resulting from private information arrival are on average
partially reversed in the long run.
2. Price moves in reaction to the arrival of public information are positively
correlated with later price changes.
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Challenges The constant confidence version of the Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998) model accords with the empirical evidence of negative long-
term autocorrelation but it does not with the evidence of positive short-term au-
tocorrelation (short-run momentum). For that reason, the authors argue that
in a model setting based on self-attribution and time-varyingor better outcome-
dependentconfidence, the short-lag autocorrelation is positive. To address this is-
sue, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) provide a second version of the
model, in which, still allowing for initial overconfidence, they firstly assume a dis-
crete public signal at time 2. Then, since the precision assessed by investor at time
2 about the previous private signals depends on the realization of the public signal,
if both signals have the same sign then investors confidence increase (investors’ as-
sessment of noise variance decreases), if signals has opposite sign then confidence
remains constant (noise variance constant). In such way, the model shows that the
overreaction phase, not just the correction phase, can contribute positively to short-
term momentum 11. Another implicationthat has been debated as wellis that, in
contrast with the common correspondence of positive (negative) return autocorrela-
tions with underreaction (overreaction) to new information, the outcome-dependent
version of the model shows that positive return autocorrelation can be a result of
continuing overreaction. So Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) conclude
that short-run positive autocorrelations can be consistent with long-run negative au-
tocorrelations.
2.6.3 Hong and Stain - A Unified Theory of Underreaction,
Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Mar-
kets
Aims The Hong and Stein (1999) model substantially differs from the above dis-
cussed model. Although all pursue the same goal, textcitehong:unif develop their
behavioral model using a different approach. They do not consider a single repre-
11For a full explanation of such results sees the original work.
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sentative class of agents subjected to different cognitive biases, but rather the aim
is to analyze principally the interaction between heterogeneous agents 12. In their
model neither type of agents is fully rational as well, in fact they assume a sim-
ple form boundeldy rationality: that is, each type of agent can process (make his
trading choice based on) only some subset of the available public information. Such
assumption is reflected in the dynamics of the model and its implications. To be
more specific, the model starts showing that when private information about funda-
mentals spreads gradually among one group (type) of agent, they (as a group) tend
to underreact to private information. Then, a second group of the traders enter
the market trying to exploit the profit left by previous traders underreacion with a
simple arbitrage strategy. But the arbitrage only partially eliminates the mispricing,
and it can creates an excessive momentum in prices that obviously culminates in
overreaction. So, in this sense, this model can be said to unify underreaction and
overreaction, as both are generated by a unique prior shock (the gradually diffusion
of the private information).
The Model As briefly presented above, in the Hong and Stein (1999) model the
agents differs in the way of being not fully rational, namely there are newswatchers
and momentum traders. On one hand, the newswatchers are boundedly rational in
the sense that they base their forecasts not on or current or past prices, but rather
on the private information about fundamentals that they privately observe. On the
other hand, momentum traders forecasts are based on past prices changes, given
that they are simple functions of the history of past prices.
The economy is composed by a risky asset, which pays a single liquidating div-
idend at the end of his life period 13 and a riskless asset, with riskless interest rate
normalized at zero. The last value of the dividend is equal to a fixed amount plus
a sum of n-dividend innovations, which are independently, distributed random vari-
12Although Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) in their model speak about two kind
of agents, this agents belong to the same representative agent class, the only difference between
them is the cognitive bias they are subjected to.
13The life period of asset could be even infinite, but what matters is that newswatchers behave
as their time horizons goes to infinity.
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able with zero mean and fixed variance. In the first phase of the model in the
market operates only the newswatchers. A series of dividend innovations start to
spread among the newswatchers, who at every time, given their risk-averse utility
function 14 formulate their asset demands based on the news they observe, being
aware that they buy and hold the asset until it pays the final liquidating dividends.
For assumption, this leave them unable to use current or past prices to form so-
phisticated forecasts of final fixed value of dividends and it also leaves the unable to
make forecasts of future price changes. Therefore, because of their trading behavior,
the prices results in a mispricing, in particular an underreaction.
In the second phase, momentum traders are added into the market. They also
have risk-averse utility, but unlike the newswatchers they have finite time horizons.
At every time, a new generation of momentum traders enters the market and trades
with the newswatchers, but they submit quantity orders, not knowing the price at
which orders will be executed, given that the price is determined by the competition
among the newswatchers. Therefore, to decide the size of these orders, momentum
traders have to predict the future asset return, conditioning on (for assumption)
past price changes 15. To give an example of the model dynamics, let assume the
first group of momentum traders comes to the market. They start trading with the
newswatchers, trying to exploit the underreaction of prices, which leads prices to
grow. This increase, in turn, attracts another group of technical traders, leading
prices even higher and so on. At a later time, prices will overshoot their equilibrium
level, so the last group of momentum traders that enter the market will suffer a
loss. This means that the first momentum traders impose on those that follow them
a negative externalities 16. Given the inability of momentum traders to condition
directly on the dividends innovations, every trader in the chain is behaving as ra-
14All the newswatchers have constant absolute risk aversion utility with the same risk-aversion
parameter.
15Hong and Stein (1999) assume that in making this forecast, the only conditioning variable is
the cumulative price change over the past k periods; that correspond to the restriction of univariate
momentum traders forecast.
16In a market economy, a negative externality occurs when an individual making a decision does
not have to pay the full cost of the decision. In other words, it is the cost that affects a party who
did not choose to incur that cost.
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tionally as possible, but the externality creates an apparently irrational outcome in
the market as a whole.
Challenges An important critique moved against Hong and Stein (1999) is that
the newswatchers’ behavior is time-inconsistent. Although at the first period they
base their demands on the premise that they do not retrade, they violate this to the
extent that they are active in later periods. Hong and Stein (1999) argue that they
adopt this time-inconsistent shortcut because it dramatically simplifies the analy-
sis. Otherwise, they would face a complex dynamic programming problem, because
newswatchers demands at each time would depend not only on their forecasts of the
liquidating dividend but also on their predictions for the entire future path of prices.

Chapter 3
A Representative Agent Model
3.1 Research Proposal
In this chapter will be provided a detailed representative agent model. The aim of
this work is to study and analyze if and to what extent, under clear assumptions,
the risk-aversion of the agent, solely, can determine deviations of prices from its
fundamental value and produce the emergence of any known market anomalies,
such as momentum and returns autocorrelations. Since the influence of the agents’
behavior on the market dynamics represents a key issue of the behavioral finance
as a whole, in the literature there are numerous theoretical studies on behavioral
models, as discussed in the capitolo prime. A pillar of such studies is represented by
the work of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998); their Model of Investor Sentiment
tries to explain, in a relative simple way, the emergence of the empirical findings
on overreaction and underreaction. They present a model with a representative
agent, showing on the theoretical ground to what extent such market anomalies are
determined by a biased behavior of the market participant, in particular they refer
to two specific bias: the representativeness and the conservatism, which have been
broadly discussed in the chapter 2. Although both our and Barberis et al. (1998)
work pursue a similar goals, the authors present a model with a representative,
risk-neutral investor with fixed discount rate, whereas our model can be seen as its
reinterpretation in a representative, risk-averse framework. Barberis et al. (1998)
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in their model consider only one security, which pays out 100% of its earnings as
dividends and they assume that the agent forms its expectation to forecast the
earning stream; in our model we consider one security 1 as well but it is a short-
lived asset, and we assume that agent forms its expectation to forecast the dividend
stream. In both models the agents beliefs on the realization of the state of the world
are determined as Markov process 2. Furthermore, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1998) consider only one case in which the agent does not realize the correct model
that is actually generating earnings, he rather believe the world moves between two
states or regimes, therefore he switches between two belief’s models; whereas we
study two different cases: one in which we assume the agent knows how actually
the market behaves, and one in which the agent is ‘uninformed’ so that his beliefs
about the realization of the state of world depend on the last observed realization.
In the following sections it will be provided a general description of the model,
and then will be studied the dynamics of agents wealth and the market price of
asset in the two scenarios mentioned above. Finally will be shown some simulation
experiments of the model and it will be discussed the implications arising from the
models results.
3.2 A General Description of The Model
Consider a simple pure exchange economy composed by a short-lived risky asset,
with price pt, paying an amount dt as dividends at the end of each period and a
riskless asset (bond) giving in each period a constant interest rate r > 0. The price
of riskless asset is fixed to 1. Let wt−1 stand for the wealth of a representative risk-
averse agent at time t−1 and let xt stand for the fraction of this wealth invested into
the risky asset. Therefore, the agent derives the optimal amount xt by maximizing
1At the macro level, we take into account also a riskless asset, that we remove afterwards to
simplify the analysis, setting the riskless interest rate equal to zero
2 A Markov process is a stochastic process that satisfies the Markov property. A process satisfies
such property if one can make predictions for the future of the process based solely on its present
state.
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Table 3.1: Times of model’s evolution
ωt−1 pt
current time
ωt wt
the expected utility of his wealth at time t
xt = argmax E[U(wt)] = E
[
U
(
wt−1 xt
dt
pt
+ wt−1(1− xt)(1 + r)
)]
.
Assume that the world can be in two states: 1 or 2. Let ωt be the state of the
world at time t and assume further that the payoffs depends on ωt and dt−1, that is:
dt = fwt(dt−1). Agent’s beliefs about the states of world follow a Markov process:
let Πt be the individual probability assigned by the agent to the event that the world
is in the state 1 at time t. This probability is a function of the last realization of
the state of the world Πt = Prob [ωt = 1|ωt−1] = Π(ωt−1).
If let R = 1+r and assume f2(dt−1) > f1(dt−1), the agent’ s expected logarithmic
utility becomes
Πt ln
(
wt−1 xt
f1(dt−1)
pt
+ wt−1(1− xt)R
)
+ (1− Πt)
ln
(
wt−1 xt
f2(dt−1)
pt
+ wt−1(1− xt)R
)
. (3.2.1)
The first order condition is given by
dU
dxt
=
Πt
(
f1
pt
−R
)
xt
f1
pt
+ (1− xt)R
+
(1− Πt)
(
f2
pt
−R
)
xt
f2
pt
+ (1− xt)R
= 0 ,
which reduces to
xt
(f1
pt
−R
)(f2
pt
−R
)
+
Πt
f2
pt
−R +
(1− Πt)
f1
pt
−R
(f2
pt
−R
)
= 0 .
58 A Representative Agent Model
Figure 3.1: Demand and supply function
If f1/R < p < f2/R then
xt = pt
(
1− Πt
pt − f1R
− Πt
f2
R
− pt
)
, (3.2.2)
notice that for the demand Dt =
xt
pt
wt−1, it is
d
dPt
Dt < 0, and
lim
pt→(f1/R)+
xt
pt
= +∞ , lim
pt→(f2/R)−
xt
pt
= −∞ .
3.3 Representative Agent
The price is set to the level which satisfies the market clearing conditions. If the
risky asset has zero outstanding shares it is
pt =
1
R
E(dt) = Πt
f1(dt−1)
R
+ (1− Πt)f2(dt−1)
R
, (3.3.1)
which is equivalent to the risk neutral evaluation; otherwise the price is fixed by
wt−1 xt
pt
= 1
wt−1
(
1− Πt
pt − f1R
− Πt
f2
R
− pt
)
= 1 ,
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which solving for pt gives
pt =
(
Rwt−1 − f1 − f2
)
+
√(
Rwt−1 − f1 − f2
)2 −Rwt−1Et−1[f ]− 4 f1f2
2 R
, (3.3.2)
with Et−1[f ] = Π(ωt−1)f1(dt−1) + 1 − Π(ωt−1)f2(dt−1) that is the expectation of f
given all the information available at time t− 1. In this way we obtain a quadratic
equation for pt in which from the graph is clear that only the greater solution (plus
solution) is acceptable.
The system for wealth and prices reads

pt =
(
Rwt−1−f1−f2
)
+
√(
Rwt−1−f1−f2
)2
−Rwt−1Et−1[f ]−4 f1f2
2 R
wt = wt−1
[
(xt
fωt (dt−1)
pt
+ (1− xt)R
]
.
(3.3.3)
Given the normalization condition wt−1 xt
pt
= 1, we can rewrite di expression for the
evolution of wealth
wt =
wt−1 xtfωt(dt−1)
pt
+ wt−1(1− xt)R =
= fωt(dt−1) + (wt−1 − pt)R , (3.3.4)
so that the syestem reads

pt =
(
Rwt−1−f1−f2
)
+
√(
Rwt−1−f1−f2
)2
−Rwt−1Et−1[f ]−4 f1f2
2 R
wt = fωt(dt−1) + (wt−1 − pt)R .
(3.3.5)
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In this section we consider an agent which invests a constant fraction of wealth in
the risky security.
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Table 3.2: Transition probabilities between two realizations of the states of the
world.
P (ωt|ωt−1) =
ωt = 1 ωt = 2
ωt−1 = 1 Π1 1− Π1
ωt−1 = 2 Π2 1− Π2
Table 3.3: Transition probabilities of the two equiprobable and independent states
of the world.
P (ωt|ωt−1) =
ωt = 1 ωt = 2
ωt−1 = 1 1/2 1/2
ωt−1 = 2 1/2 1/2
3.4.1 Informed agent
We assume, in this case, that the agent operating in the market is well informed;
therefore he knows how the market behaves. In other words, the probability the
agent assigns to a certain realization of the state of the world equals the ”real”
probability. We further assume that the two state are equiprobable and independent
from previous realization such that Π1 = Π2 = 1/2 (see Table 3.2). If we assume
R = 1, that is the riskless interest rate equals zero, and d1 = f1(dt−1) = 1 − λ,
d2 = f2(dt−1) = 1 + λ, then
Et−1[f ] =
1
2
(1 + λ) +
1
2
(1− λ) = 1 .
Wealth Dynamics
The evolution of agent’s wealth can be rewritten as
wt = fωt + (1− x)wt−1 , (3.4.1)
where wt is a function of the wealth at a time t− 1 and of the evolving of the states
of the world, and the price is simply fixed by
pt = x wt−1 . (3.4.2)
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The expected value of the wealth at time t conditional on the knowledge of the
wealth at time t− 1 is
Et−1[wt|wt−1] = 1 + (1− x)wt−1 .
The dynamics of the wealth over the time depends on the realizations of the state
of the world, as stated in the first section, which can be shown by the transition
matrix (see Table 3.3).
The next step consists in determining the general expression of the wealth un-
conditional to the instant of time the model is, and analyzes the raw and the central
moment of the considered variable. The general expression for wt reads
wt = (1− x)t w0 +
t∑
1
τ fωτ (1− x)t−τ , (3.4.3)
and its expected value is
E[wt] = (1− x)t w0 +
t∑
1
τ (1− x)t−τ =
= (1− x)t w0 + 1− (1− x)
t
x
. (3.4.4)
Notice that if w0 = 1/x, then the expected value of wealth is stationary
E[wt] =
1
x
. (3.4.5)
In such particular case the wealth dynamics can be rewritten
wt =
1
x
+
t∑
1
τ (fωt − 1)(1− x)t−τ , (3.4.6)
and the second central moment reads
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V [wt] = E
[(
1
x
+
t∑
1
τ1 (fωτ1 − 1)(1− x)t−τ1 −
1
x
)
(
1
x
+
t∑
1
τ2 (fωτ2 − 1)(1− x)t−τ2 −
1
x
)
=
t∑
1
τ1
t∑
1
τ2(1− x)2t−τ1−τ2 E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1)] . (3.4.7)
According to the previous assumption it is
E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1)] = λ2 δτ1,τ2 , (3.4.8)
where δ is the Kronecker delta, that is a function of two variables which can assume
two values: δi,j = 1 if i = j and zero otherwise. Now is it possible to solve 3.4.7
using the result of 3.4.8, obtaining
V [wt] =
t∑
1
τ1
t∑
1
τ2(1− x)2t−τ1−τ2 δτ1,τ2 λ2 =
=
t−1∑
0
τ1(1− x)2τ1 λ2 =
= λ2
1− (1− x)2t
1− (1− x)2 . (3.4.9)
To get a full view of the dynamics of the wealth we are now interested in analyzing
how the wealth at a certain time t and the wealth at a time t − 1 co-vary, that
is in determining their correlation coefficient. We expect to find the presence of
evident time dependence in the covariance function and strictly positive or negative
correlation. The cov(wt, wt−1) is given by
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E
[(
wt − E[wt]
)(
wt−1 − E[wt−1]
)]
=
=E
[( t∑
1
τ1 (fωτ1 − 1)(1− x)t−τ1
)( t−1∑
1
τ2 (fωτ2 − 1)(1− x)t−τ2
)]
=
= (1− x) E
[( t−1∑
1
τ1 (fωτ1 − 1)(1− x)t−1−τ1
)2 ]
+
+E
[
(1− x)t−1(fωt − 1)
t−1∑
1
τ2 (fωτ2 − 1)(1− x)t−1−τ2
]
= ,
but given that the realization at time t is independent of the previous realization
and that
E[fωt − 1] = 0 and E
[( t−1∑
1
τ1 (fωτ1 − 1)(1− x)t−1−τ1
)2 ]
= V [wt−1] ,
then
E
[(
wt − E[wt]
)(
wt−1 − E[wt−1]
)]
= (1− x) V [wt−1] , (3.4.10)
this imply that the covariance of the distribution depends on the time, as we ex-
pected. The correlation coefficient, on the other hand, is given by
C =
(1− x) V [wt−1]√
V [wt−1] V [wt]
= (1− x)
√
V [wt−1]
V [wt]
=
√
1− (1− x)2t−2
1− (1− x)2t (1− x) , (3.4.11)
where for t → +∞, this ratio tend to 1 − x. It turns out that the autocorrelation
coefficient asymptotically tend to 1− x, implying that each realization of wealth is
positively influenced by the previous realization, and it determines in a relevant way
the subsequent realization. Once determined the characteristics of the dynamic of
the wealth, the following step is to analyze the influence such dynamics have on the
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distribution of prices.
Price dynamics
As assumed in the previous section, in this representative agent model the price at
any time t is a function of the optimum quantity of wealth invested in the short-
lived asset, and of the wealth of the representative agent at time t − 1 (see 3.4.1).
In order to study analytically the behavior of the variable price, let us introduce a
new variable r, that we call absolute return or absolute price growth. The absolute
return is simply the difference between the price at a time t and the price at a time
t− 1, in term of this model it is given by
rt+1 = pt+1 − pt = x(wt − wt−1) =
= x fωt − x2 wt−1 . (3.4.12)
The last step of the analysis consists in determining if there are any signals of
predictability or correlation in price dynamics. To do so, we compute the covariance
between returns, from time t+ 2 to time t+ 1. Following from 3.4.12, since
E[rt+1] = x− x2 1
x
= 0 , (3.4.13)
then
E(rt+2 rt+1) =
=E[(x fωt+1 − x2 wt)(x fωt − x2 wt−1)]
=x2 E[fωt+1 ] E[fωt ]− x3 E[fωt+1 ] E[wt−1]− x3 E[fωt wt] + x4 E[wt wt−1] =
=x4 E[wt wt−1]− x3
[
(1 + λ2) +
(1− x)
x
]
= , (3.4.14)
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Table 3.4: Markovian transition matrix: probabilities of realization of the states
depend only on the previous realization.
P (ωt|ωt−1) =
ωt = 1 ωt = 2
ωt−1 = 1
1
2
+ δ1
1
2
− δ2
ωt−1 = 2
1
2
− δ1 1
2
+ δ2
but from 3.4.10 we know that E[wt wt−1] = V [wt−1] + 1/x2, then it turns out that
E(rt+2 rt+1) = x
4
(
V [wt−1] +
1
x2
)
− x2 − x3 λ2 =
= x4V [wt−1]− x3 λ2 =
= x4λ2
1− (1− x)2t−2
1− (1− x)2 − x
3 λ2 , (3.4.15)
where for t→ +∞, if λ ≤ 1 the covariance in absolute returns distribution asymp-
totically tend to zero, if λ > 1 the covariance is slightly positive for 0.5 < x < 1,
and it is slightly negative for 0 < x < 0.5.
3.4.2 Uninformed agent
In the previous subsection we discussed about the dynamics of wealth and prices
for the case of a representative ‘informed’ agent, where ‘informed’ means that the
agent assigns the same probability to the each possible realization of the state of
the world (see Table 3.3). Let now turn to the case of an ‘uninformed’ agent in
which the probability the agent assigns to the realization of the states of the world
depends on the observation of the previous realization. The aim is to analyzes the
dynamics of the model and compare the results with the previous section.
Wealth dynamics
In this case the transition matrix can be represented by Table 3.4, with
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Table 3.5: Symmetric Markovian transition matrix.
P (ωt|ωt−1) =
ωt = 1 ωt = 2
ωt−1 = 1
1
2
+ δ
1
2
− δ
ωt−1 = 2
1
2
− δ 1
2
+ δ
Π1 =
1
2
− δ2
1− δ1 − δ2 and Π2 =
1
2
− δ1
1− δ1 − δ2 .
If we assume δ1 = δ2 = δ, where δ can assume values between −1/2 and 1/2
(δ ∈ (−1
2
; 1
2
)), we obtain a symmetric transition matrix as it is shown in Table 3.5.
Notice that
E[fωt |ωt−1] =

1 + 2λδ if ωt−1 = 1
1− 2λδ if ωt−1 = 1 ,
but the invariant distribution of the process is
(
− 1
2
,
1
2
)
so that
E[fωt ] = 1 .
As for the case of informed agent, notice that if w0 = 1/x, it yields the same general
expression for the wealth dynamics (3.4.6)
wt =
1
x
+
t∑
1
τ (fωt − 1)(1− x)t−τ ,
with stationary expected value of wealth (3.4.5).
Following the assumed procedure the next steps consist in analyzing to what
extent the wealth co-varies over the time and its degree of correlation, comparing
it with the result yielded by the 3.4.10 and by the 3.4.11, and in showing how such
dynamics can have an influence on the working of absolute return series.
Given the transition matrix 3.4, the probability of the two states now depends
on the previous realization, so that for τ1 = τ2
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E[(fωτ − 1)2] = λ2 ,
for τ1 = τ2 + 1
E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1)] = λ2
(
1
2
+ δ − 1
2
+ δ
)
= 2λ2δ , (3.4.16)
and in general
E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1)] = λ2 (2δ)|τ1−τ2| .
We start with the calculus of the cov(wt wt−1) , that is
E
[(
wt − E[wt]
)(
wt−1 − E[wt−1]
)]
=
=
t∑
1
τ1
t−1∑
1
τ2(1− x)2t−1−τ1−τ2E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1) =
=(1− x)V [wt−1] + λ2 (2δ) 1− (1− x)
t−1(2δ)t−1
1− (1− x)(2δ) . (3.4.17)
Since we defined the evolution of the states of the world as a Markov process, the
second central moment of the variable wealth now reads
V [wt−1] = E[(wt − E[wt])2] =
=
t−1∑
1
τ1,τ2(1− x)2t−τ1−τ2 E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1)] =
=
t∑
1
τ1,τ2(1− x)2t−τ1−τ2 (2δ)τ1−τ2 λ2 . (3.4.18)
It is possible to compute the variance of wealth with
V [wt] =
t−1∑
0
i,j(1− x)i+j (2δ)|i−j| λ2 ,
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defining V ∗ as the limit of variance for t→ +∞
V ∗ = lim
t→+∞
V [wt] =
+∞∑
−∞
d
+∞∑
d
s(1− x)s (2δ)|d| ,
with i+ j = s and i− j = d then
V ∗ =
1
x
(
1
1− (1− x)(2δ) +
(2δ)
1− x− 2δ
)
. (3.4.19)
The last step in the analysis of the wealth distribution consists in computing the
covariance between wt and wt−2 , that is
E
[(
wt − E[wt]
)(
wt−2 − E[wt−2]
)]
=
=
t∑
1
τ1
t−2∑
1
τ2(1− x)2t−1−τ1−τ2E[(fωτ1 − 1)(fωτ2 − 1) =
=(1− x)2V [wt−1] + λ2 (1− x) (2δ) 1− (1− x)
t−2(2δ)t−2
1− (1− x)(2δ) +
+ λ2 (2δ)2
1− (1− x)t−2(2δ)t−2
1− (1− x)(2δ) , (3.4.20)
then
lim
t→+∞
cov(wt wt−1) = (1− x) V ∗ + 2δλ
2
1− (1− x)(2δ) , (3.4.21)
that asymptotically tend to a positive value, in particular the higher is δ, the higher
in magnitude is its asymptotic value, and
lim
t→+∞
cov(wt wt−2) = (1− x)2 V ∗ + 2δ(1− x)λ
2
1− (1− x)(2δ ) +
(2δ)2λ2
1− (1− x)(2δ) . (3.4.22)
Price dynamics
In the previous section we defined the variable ‘absolute return’ r at a certain time t
as the difference between the price at a time t and the price at a time t−1. In order
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to find any signals of anomalies in price dynamics we need to analyze the covariance
in returns. To do so, given that
E[rt+1] = x− x2 1
x
= 0 ,
then it obtains
E(rt+2 rt+1) = x
2E[(wt+1 + wt)(wt − wt−1)] ,
but we know that
E[(wt+1 − wt)(wt − wt−1)] = (1− x)2t−1λ2(2δ) ,
then it turns out
E(rt+2 rt+1) = x
2 (1− x)2t−1λ2(2δ) . (3.4.23)
The covariance in absolute disstribution then is time dependent and for t → +∞
asymptotically tends to zero.
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3.5 Simulation Experiments and Implications
In order to evaluate our model, in this section we try to extend the analytical find-
ings of the previous sections using artificial data sets of wealth, prices and absolute
returns simulated from our model, commenting the results and underlying its im-
plications. First we fix parameter values, setting the optimal fraction of wealth
invested in the risky asset to x = 0.5 and the shock in dividend to λ = 0.5. We set
the initial level of wealth to w0 = 1/x and we simulate the model for a time horizon
T = 1000. Similarly to the analytical study, we distinguish the simulation between
the two cases: informed agent and uninformed agent.
3.5.1 I.i.d. Process
We start the simulation experiments with the case in which the two states are
equiprobable and independent from previous realizations. First we simulate the
variable wealth; its series is shown in Figure 3.2. In Section 3.4 we found the auto-
correlation coefficient of wealth, arguing that it should tend to 1− x, implying the
presence of positive autocorrelation in the series (equation 3.4.11). The simulation
confirms our expectation, as can be seen from the figure 3.3 which shows the au-
tocorrelagram and the partial autocorrelogram of wealth distribution. The PACF
confirm the AR(1) nature of the process.
However, we are interested in analyzing how wealth dynamic can influence the
distribution of prices and the distribution of absolute returns. We wish to find the
presence of autocorrelation in returns, indicating the emergence of anomalies in re-
turns consistent with the behavioral finance studies. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show
the results of the simulation for absolute returns, in terms of time-series and auto-
correlograms. These results, display the pattern we expect. As it is evident in the
autoocorrelogram in Figure 3.5, the absolute returns are negatively autocorrelated
in the short-run but such correlation tend to disappear over longer horizons, pattern
that confirms our analytical findings and it is also consistent with the evidence on
overreaction (Fama and French (1988) and Bondt and Thaler (1985)). The same
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pattern occurs when simulating the model with constant fraction of wealth set to
x = 0.8, as shown in Figure 3.6 - 3.9. As a consequence we have found that when
the beliefs of a representative risk-averse agent on the possible realization the world
equals the real probability, assuming states equiprobable and independent, even if
we do not assume any kind of biases in the representative agents beliefs, the risk-
aversion of the agent, alone, can determine the emergence of anomalies in the market
discussed in this thesis.
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Figure 3.2: Wealth time-series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.5, λ = 0.5
Figure 3.3: Wealth autocorrelogram lag = 10
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Figure 3.4: Returns series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.5, λ = 0.5
Figure 3.5: Returns autocorrelogram lag = 10
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Figure 3.6: Wealth series sfor the last 100 periods, x = 0.8, λ = 0.5
Figure 3.7: Wealth autocorrelogram lag = 10, x = 0.8
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Figure 3.8: Returns series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.8, λ = 0.5
Figure 3.9: Returns autocorrelogram lag = 10, x = 0.8
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3.5.2 Markovian process
In the case that we called uninformed we assumed that the realization of the state the
world at a time t depends on the realization observed previously, at a time t− 1. In
particular we studied analytically the case of symmetric transition probabilities: that
is, observing a certain realization, for example assume it is positive, if δ is positive
it is more likely that the subsequent realization will be positive as well, on the other
hand, it is more likely to revert if δ is negative.We start the experiment simulating the
time series of wealth, prices and related absolute return in the case of positive δ, in
particular we set δ = 0.3. Looking at Figure 3.11, which shows the autocorrelagram
and the partial autocorrelogram, it is evident that wealth distribution is positively
autocorrelated, confirming our analytical findings.
However, as for the informed case, the main aim is to examine the dynamics
of the absolute return. In the case of δ > 0 we the autocorrelogram of returns
shown in Figure 3.13 confirm our expectations, returns are positively correlated in
very short-run implying that the sign of return could be a good predictor for the
subsequent return, but in the short-run tend to be negatively autocorrelated. Such
results are consistent with several empirical studies (Cutler, Poterba, and Summers
1991), which found that such positive autocorrelation exsists only in the very short
run.
Let now turn to the case of δ < 0. In particular we set δ = −0.3 and then we
run the simulation. Both the wealth distribution and the price ditribution follow
the pattern we derived in the analytical study (Section 3.4.2). In fact, as shown in
Figure 3.15,wealth distributions is positively autocorrelated. For what concern the
evolution of returns series, Figure 3.17 shows that returns are negatively autocorre-
lated in the short-run and then such autocorrelation tend to disappear over longer
horizons. This result confirms our analytical findings, and it is also consistent with a
mean-reverting behavior of returns treated in the literature (Poterba and Summers
(1988), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)). As a consequence we have shown
that in a representative agent framework in which the evolution of the states of the
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world follows a Markov process, the risk-aversion of the agent that operates in the
market, can cause the emergence of signals of inefficiency in the stock market.
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Figure 3.10: Wealth time-series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.5, λ = 0.5, δ = 0.3
Figure 3.11: Wealth autocorrelogram lag = 10, δ = 0.3
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Figure 3.12: Returns series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.5, λ = 0.5, δ = 0.3
Figure 3.13: Returns autocorrelogram lag = 10, δ = 0.3
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Figure 3.14: Wealth series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.8, λ = 0.5, δ = −0.3
Figure 3.15: Wealth autocorrelogram lag = 10, δ = −0.3
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Figure 3.16: Returns series for the last 100 periods, x = 0.5, λ = 0.5, δ = −0.3
Figure 3.17: Returns autocorrelogram lag = 10, δ = −0.3

Conclusion
he last 30 years have been very busy for academic finance. Financial markets have
been studied under several points of view and now we have a knowledge of their
behavior and of market operators that is nearly complete. Among the many changes
of views, the increased skepticism about market efficiency has been a central issue
although it has been very controversial. Such skepticism derives from many sources
that have put the basis to a new discipline: Behavioral Finance.
Behavioral finance has provided both theory and evidence which suggest what
deviations of securities from fundamental values are likely to be, and why the can
persist over long time without being eliminated. In many cases, behavioral theo-
ries have been developed on the basis of the strong and relevant empirical findings,
discussed in Chapter 1, challenging the efficient market hypothesis. Although empir-
ical evidence was the real first instrument of behavioralists against efficient market
theorists, the debates over market efficiency continue, so that behavioral finance
derive its strength by its behavioral explanations of the so-called anomalies, which
materialized in theories of investor behavior. The study of the psychology of market
participants has been absolutely innovative, that has provided theories and expla-
nation in many cases incontestable. The usefulness of behavioral finance lies in
offering a richer description of investor behavior than those captured by fully ratio-
nal utility maximizers with limited heterogeneityfor example in risk preferences by
giving a collection of possible heuristics and biases, which have been documented in
a financial , or sometimes a more general, decision-making setting. The relevance
of each behavioral phenomenon should be treated as a research question on its own
and addressed using appropriate techniques.
84 Conclusion
In this context take place several behavioral models that have been developed
during the last 20 years, which try to explain, on the theoretical ground, the emer-
gence of market anomalies, return predictability, underreaction and overreaction,
momentum strategy and others. This thesis aims to contribute to this literature,
providing a detailed representative agent model. Despite many behavioral models,
as those discussed in Chapter 2, our model does not take into account particu-
lar biases that can affect the investors behaviors, such as representativeness and
conservatism in Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) or overconfidence and self-
attribution in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), rather it wonders if
and to what extent, a risk-averse agent can be considered has biased in its beliefs
and then determine stock price deviations or returns autocorrelation. In our model
there is a representative risk-averse agent, which behaves as expected utility maxi-
mizers and invests a constant fraction of wealth in a short-lived risky asset. Further
we assumed that the world can be in two states, so that we studied two different
cases: one in which the two states are equiprobable and independent from previous
realization and one in which the realization of the states depend only on the previous
realization. After deriving analytically the dynamics of wealth, price and returns,
we simulated the model. The results of the simulation showed that in both cases
returns are autocorrelated, implying that returns are not completely unpredictable
as stated by market efficiency, even when agent has not biased beliefs.
To enhance the implications of our findings the hope of the candidate is to goes
ahead in its academic career, learning and acquire more instrument and techniques to
extend such model, for example introducing an agent allowing then for heterogeneity,
and adding more risky assets in order to allow a portfolio diversification.
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